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ABSTRACT: THE VIRTUOUS DRONE PILOT By	  Captain	  Joseph	  O.	  Chapa,	  US	  Air	  Force	  Advised	  by	  Professor	  Ken	  Himes,	  OFM	  
This thesis responds to two distinct claims about drone (or remotely piloted 
aircraft) pilots. The first is the general claim that the martial virtues function as a kind of 
role morality for soldiers; the second, that drone pilots, based on the absence of personal 
risk and their distance from the battlefield, are unable to meet the demands of such a role 
morality. Chapter One explains what is meant by role morality, and determines whether 
the martial virtues do in fact function in a role morality capacity. The second chapter 
applies this general conception of a role morality for soldiers to military drone pilots in 
particular. This investigation finds that, insofar as "soldier" is in fact a role that generates 
a role morality, military drone pilots are as capable of meeting the demands of such a role 
morality as other military members. The second half of the thesis challenges the premise 
that drone pilots do not face personal risk. Chapter Three identifies psychological risk 
among drone pilots and seeks to determine how this kind of non-physical risk may affect 
the cultivation of the martial virtues. The fourth chapter argues that by placing military 
drone pilots within domestic territory, drone-capable militaries (such as the US military) 
have redrawn the battlespace such that it includes the drone operators, wherever they may 
be, and that as a result, drone pilots do in fact face some physical risk. Finally, in closing, 
this thesis presents a positive account of the martial virtues that enables military ethicists 
and strategists to bring centuries of philosophical investigation to bear on contemporary 
military issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 	  
  This thesis is, if not a response to, then at least prompted by Rob Sparrow’s 
Chapter, “War Without Virtue?” in Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an 
Unmanned Military, edited by Bradley Jay Strawser (Oxford, 2013).1 The rapidly 
growing collection of books and articles on the ethics of drones2 has done well to frame 
the important questions and provide some answers, but if there is a thematic problem, it is 
that to a great extent the pilots are left out of it. That is, in many conceptions of drones 
and in many analyses of their ethics authors consider the targets, the technology, the 
policy and the policy-makers, and friendly forces on the ground; but the agency of the 
pilot is largely ignored. Sparrow has done something different. Sparrow sets aside the 
question of whether drones are ethical for the sake of the much narrower question: Can 
drone pilots cultivate martial virtues? Those of us concerned with the ethics of remote 
weapons are indebted to Sparrow for his chapter, as it is the first serious work that seeks 
to address this modern method of war making from a virtue theory perspective.3 Put 
another way, Sparrow has set a course for a virtue ethics approach to remote warriors. In 
the discussion that follows, I will attempt a slight course correction. 
 Sparrow’s chapter suggests that the martial virtues are a role morality for soldiers. 
He then argues that because drone pilots face no risk, they cannot cultivate the martial 
virtues (or, at the very least, drone operators will face great difficulty in cultivating 
them.)4 It is around this set of themes then, role morality, martial virtue, and risk to drone 
pilots, that this thesis revolves. 
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Martial Virtues as Role Morality 
 First, the very title of Sparrow’s chapter, “War Without Virtue?,” in a book on the 
Ethics of an Unmanned Military points the reader to the recent resurgence in virtue 
theory among contemporary philosophers. There is some disagreement as to how the 
virtues are to be employed, what means we have to cultivate them, and what ethical 
questions they are fit to answer. A thorough discussion of contemporary virtue theory, 
and the various answers philosophers have developed to these questions is outside the 
scope of this thesis. What is required here is to determine what Sparrow’s position is on 
the relationship between those virtues that are peculiarly martial and normative ethics,5 
and then to determine the validity of the application of that position to drone pilots. 
Within the discussion of the virtues, there are specific questions about those 
virtues considered to be martial, or of particular military value or interest. While much 
has been written on virtue theory in the last fifty years, scholars have had much less to 
say about specifically martial virtues.6 What can be agreed upon, though, is that if the 
virtues are of any ethical importance at all, then the cultivation of those virtues in men 
and women who kill and die professionally is also dearly important. That said, what 
precisely is meant by “martial virtue” can vary widely from one author to another. 
Sparrow sees the martial virtues as a kind of role morality for soldiers.7 Once 
again, we are faced with differing views on role morality in the literature. A broad 
characterization upon which many theorists may agree is that role morality suggests that 
an agent faces two sets of moral responsibilities. The first consists of general 
responsibilities, grounded in one’s status as a human being (or rational agent). The other 
consists of special responsibilities, grounded in one’s morally significant roles or 
relationships.8 Thus, Sparrow grounds his conclusions about drone operators’ capacity (or 
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lack thereof) for cultivating the martial virtues in this premise: That the martial virtues 
are a kind of role morality for soldiers. 
A Special Kind of Virtue 
Much of what Sparrow has to say about drone operators and the martial virtues 
incorporates risk. Sparrow is concerned that modern methods of war making may have 
undermined (or may be undermining) the historical value the martial virtues have held;9 
and while many weapons systems reduce risk to warfighters, drones represent the apogee 
in this trend,10 asserting that drone pilots are “[successfully removed] from the theater of 
operations entirely, allowing them to ‘fight’ wars in complete safety from the air-
conditioned comfort of their command modules.”11  
One can easily see, then, that if the absence of risk poses a threat to a traditional 
understanding of the martial virtues, and if the risk reduction produced by drones 
represents an apogee, then drones will pose a significant problem for traditional 
interpretations of the martial virtues; and this is exactly what Sparrow intends to show. 
Sparrow sees risk as so important to the martial virtues, in fact, that he defines a 
number of martial virtues in terms of personal risk. For Sparrow, loyalty “involves a 
willingness to bear risks and make sacrifices for the sake of that to which one is loyal.” 
And again, “in military contexts [loyalty] usually means a willingness to suffer physical 
hardships and even to risk death for the sake of the other members of a combat unit, and 
its commander.”12 Similarly, “honor is vital insofar as it plays a crucial role in helping 
motivate warriors to risk life and limb for the sake of the cause in which they fight and in 
motivating them to live up to ethical ideals.”13 Though Sparrow distinguishes between 
physical and moral risk, he defines physical risk as “the willingness to face fear of bodily 
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discomfort, injury, and death.”14 In Sparrow’s list of four martial virtues (honor, loyalty, 
courage, and mercy), the only one not defined in terms of personal risk is mercy.15 And 
yet, he still invokes risk in assessing the mercy of drone pilots. He suggests that mercy in 
the military context is to choose “the option not to exercise this power [to kill] even when 
they would be justified in doing so. … Since the [drone] operators, though, are not in any 
danger, it is more plausible to expect them to follow orders [to kill] from other people 
who may be geographically distant.”16 
Sparrow’s definitions of the martial virtues of courage, honor, loyalty, and his 
application of mercy to drone pilots provide two means by which we can respond. First, 
we can determine whether Sparrow is right to define these martial virtues in terms of 
personal risk.17 That is, we must determine the degree to which the martial virtues, and 
one’s ability to maintain them, depend upon one’s exposure to personal risk. Second, 
even if one decides that Sparrow’s approach is the right one, and that there is a special 
kind of martial honor, for example, that has personal risk as a necessary condition, in 
order to follow Sparrow to his conclusion, one must also accept the empirical claim that 
drone operators do not face personal risk.  
In short, Sparrow’s conclusions about drone operators are grounded in the 
following claims: (1) The martial virtues are a kind of role morality for soldiers; and (2) 
in order to cultivate the martial virtues, soldiers must face risk to themselves. In order to 
respond to these claims, then, we will have to say something about the martial virtues, 
and something about risk. These two topics provide the two-part structure to this thesis. 
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Overview 
Part I of this thesis (including chapters one and two) is devoted to a theoretical 
discussion of the virtues, both moral and martial, and Part II (including chapters three and 
four) addresses specific questions about the risks faced by drone pilots. 
Chapter one investigates Sparrow’s claim that the martial virtues, properly 
understood, are a kind of role morality for military people. I will argue that, while this 
interpretation is a possible one, it is far from conclusive. The two tandem claims, first that 
the role of “soldier” generates a role morality, and second that such a role morality 
consists in the cultivation of martial virtues, both require significant additional work.  
My intent in chapter one is humble. First, I will compare the role of “soldier” (or 
“military person”)18 against the role morality accounts of J. L. A. Garcia and Samuel 
Scheffler. While each theory allows for the possibility that “soldier” may meet the criteria 
required for it to generate special moral obligations, neither theory allows for a decisive 
conclusion. I have devoted a significant portion of this paper to the discussion of role 
morality, despite the relatively soft conclusions, because it is an important question, not 
only as it applies to drone operators in particular, but also for twenty-first century soldiers 
in general, and one that I hope will receive the attention of more scholarship in the future.  
Where chapter one addressed a role morality for soldiers, more generally, chapter 
two will determine the degree to which that role morality can be, or ought to be, applied 
to drone pilots in particular. Chapter two will yield two important conclusions. The first 
of which relates to the theoretical limitations of assessing the ability of a species (“drone 
pilot”) to meet the special moral demands of its genus (“soldier”). The second, relying on 
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some important empirical evidence, addresses the capacity for actual U.S. military drone 
pilots to cultivate martial virtues. 
Part II turns its attention to the risks faced by drone operators. Chapter three 
draws heavily from previously published works on the psychological effects of killing, 
and it argues that, though the risks faced by drone pilots may be less severe than those 
faced by other warfighters, they are non-zero. That is, even if one accepts Sparrow’s view 
that martial virtue requires personal risk, drone pilots may, based upon the psychological 
risks, be candidates for the cultivation of such virtues.  
While this chapter on psychological risk has value in the discussion of Sparrow’s 
claims, it may also, on its own, impact the discussion of drone ethics. If it can be shown 
that (1) drone pilots face risk, and (2) drone pilots act on the behalf of someone else, then 
the lethal activities of drone operators may be seen as sacrificial. If there is a cost to 
drone operators, and a benefit that falls always to someone else, then far from seeing 
drone pilots as morally dubious in their abstraction from the hard realities of war, one 
may begin to see drone pilots as sacrificial agents; risking something of value to 
themselves always to the benefit of their fellow soldiers. 
Chapter four takes the discussion of risk a step further and suggests that, though 
in recent conflicts it has not precipitated, drone pilots may, in fact, also face physical risk. 
This chapter demonstrates that, contrary to the ordinary language with which we describe 
drone warfare, drone pilots are in fact physically present in the relevant battlespace, and 
are (at least conceptually and in the morally relevant sense) exposed to some physical 
risk. Though this task may at first seem merely theoretical, it is of great importance to the 
discussion. Many theorists (including Sparrow) have made categorical claims about the 
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ethics of drone operations based, not on categorical facts about drone operations, but on 
contingent ones. If the arguments in chapter four are accepted, ethical arguments against 
drones that are grounded in observations about physical risk, if they are accepted at all, 
will be limited only to conflicts bearing extreme technological and risk asymmetry. For 
example, though they may apply to a U.S. war with al Qaeda, they may not apply to a 
hypothetical U.S. war against a peer (or near peer) threat. 
Finally, the concluding section will briefly present a positive account of the 
martial virtues as they relate to drone operators. This positive account is appealing in that 
it does not require one set of virtues for drone pilots and a distinct set for soldiers. Indeed, 
it does not even require that the set of virtues required of soldiers be distinct from the set 
required of civilians. Instead, it points to the traditional virtues of honor, courage, and 
friendship, and suggests that they ought to stand on their own, as Aristotle (and many 
philosophers since) would have them stand, and that they can be contextually applied 
differently for soldiers than for civilians. In short, this account will suggest that just as 
there can be virtuous soldiers, virtuous grocers, and virtuous electricians, so can there be 
virtuous drone pilots.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. Rob Sparrow, “War Without Virtue?,” in Killing by Remote Control, ed. Bradley Jay Strawser 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
2. Or “remotely piloted aircraft,” or “unmanned aircraft,” or “unmanned aircraft systems,” or 
“uninhabited military systems.” The name game is on-going. The common term “drone” is unfortunate 
because it is too inclusive. While the term “drone” includes U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reapers (with similar 
weapons loads to the U.S. Air Force F-16), it can also include the twelve-inch remotely piloted cameras 
used during live music events to capture audience participation. A lethal MQ-9 in Yemen, controlled by an 
operator in Nevada poses ethical questions that an airborne apparatus for crowd-surfing photos does not. In 
spite of this difficulty, in keeping with common practice, I will use the term “drone” throughout this thesis. 
Unless otherwise stated, by “drone” I mean armed military platforms that can be controlled from great 
distances, such as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper. 
3. B. J. Strawser, “Introduction,” in Killing by Remote Control, ed. Bradley Jay Strawser (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 22. 
4. Sparrow, “War Without Virtue?,” 100. Sparrow leaves open the possibility that drone operators 
may be able to cultivate the martial virtue of honor, but finds it unlikely. “My initial investigations suggest 
… that the operations of [drones] also pose a substantial challenge to this important martial virtue.” 
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5. Robert Merrihew Adams, A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2006), 4. With Adams, I recognize that the term “normative ethics” suggests questions 
about what one ought to do at the exclusion of questions about how one ought to live. Nevertheless, given 
the pervasiveness of “normative,” I use it instead of Adams’ own “substantive ethics” terminology 
throughout this paper. 
6. René Moelker and Peter Olsthoorn, “Introduction,” Journal of Military Ethics 6, no. 4 (2007): 
257. 
7. Sparrow, “War Without Virtue?,” 84, 92. 
8. See Sarah J. Harper, “Role-Centered Morality” (PhD Dissertation, Boston College, 2007), 37; 
and Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 126. This two grounds 
characterization excludes the role-centered morality held by Harper and J. L. A. Garcia, but this will be 
discussed later. 
9. “The operations of UMS pose a significant risk to the place of the martial virtues within the 
organizational culture of the armed services and to current understandings of the ethics of war.” Sparrow, 
“War Without Virtue?,” 104. 
10. Sparrow, “War Without Virtue?,” 97, 100,  
11. Ibid 88. 
12. Ibid 90.  
13. Ibid 91. 
14. Ibid 89. 
15. Ibid 92. “To be merciful is to refrain, out of compassion, from killing or causing suffering 
when one is both able and would be justified in doing so.”  
16. Sparrow, “War Without Virtue?,” 100. 
17. I am careful to distinguish between physical and psychological risk, as well as between 
personal and corporate risk. I will elaborate on these distinctions in Chapter Three of this thesis.  
18. I have no intention to distinguish between “soldier” and other military positions (such as 
“airman,” or “sailor.”) Where the distinction is intended, I will make it explicit. In all other cases, the term 
“soldier” is inclusive of all uniformed members of a sovereign state’s military. 
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PART I: MARTIAL VIRTUE 
Chapter One – Soldiers, Martial Virtues, and Role Morality 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer the question of whether the martial virtues can serve 
as a kind of role morality for soldiers. Rob Sparrow, in his chapter, “War Without 
Virtue?” specifically cites the martial virtues in the capacity of role morality.1 
Methodologically, Sparrow looks first at those values and virtues to which individual 
military organizations profess devotion. “As a number of authors have observed, these 
statements [about virtue and values]—and others like them, which may be found in the 
self-descriptions of many armed services around the world—set out a distinctive ‘role 
morality’ for members of the armed services—a ‘warrior code.’”2 And again, a “warrior 
code defines a ‘role morality’ and that the form and place of particular virtues in an 
ethical life may be different in different roles.”3  
As Sparrow himself suggests, this view is not unique to him. Further review 
reveals a number of scholars who, even if they do not directly posit that the martial 
virtues are a role morality, they at least imply it. There is an additional group of scholars 
who have, without taking the full stride to role morality, identified the martial virtues as 
those virtues that help warriors to be proficient.4 In the discussion that follows, we will 
see that role morality theory may be of help in bringing these claims about the efficacy of 
soldiers into the conversation about the ethics of soldiers.5 
There are compelling reasons to think that soldiers ought to be good, but what is 
meant by “good?” Implying more than just effectiveness, this use of “good” seems to 
suggest that soldiers ought to be morally good. One thinks of recent media attention on 
the U.S. military’s treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib,6 the “enhanced interrogation 
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techniques” at CIA black sites,7 and the U.S.’s robust drone program including its strikes 
outside regions of publically acknowledged hostilities (such as Iraq from 2003 to 2011 
and Afghanistan from 2001 to present).8 Though certainly questions have been raised 
about the efficacy of these programs,9 it seems that these questions are distinct from the 
ones about ethics. The citizens of the U.S. are not only interested in training soldiers to 
do well, but also in training soldiers to be good. 
The matter of how the martial virtues fit into the soldier’s role (or the degree to 
which they fit) is not simple. Suppose, for example, that U.S. citizens expect soldiers to 
be good people in addition to performing their soldiering duties well. If this is the case, 
then the study of martial virtues is of very limited ethical value. The first requirement, 
that soldiers be moral qua people, points us to the question of what makes for a good 
person (or for good actions), and this question is the same one asked throughout the 
history of normative ethics. If in fact, the correct (or a correct) answer to this question 
involves the virtues, there is no reason that it should be limited to the particularly martial 
ones. One need only adopt the best (or right) virtue ethics theory and apply it to soldiers 
qua people. On this view, the moral goodness of soldiers is no different from the moral 
goodness of anyone else. The requirement to be “martially” virtuous is, on this line of 
thinking, conspicuously absent.  
This view still might find value in the martial virtues, but only insofar as they help 
to make soldiers more effective. For example, a soldier will (all else being equal) only 
subject herself to enemy fire to complete her mission if she has cultivated the virtue of 
courage. While this may be a true claim, it is not an ethical one. That is, if the only value 
of the martial virtues is that they enable soldiers to effectively carry out their duties, then 
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the martial virtues are of no significance to normative ethics. They are a means to a non-
ethical end; namely, an effective military. 
Role morality may be in a position to move this discussion forward. In her famous 
1958 essay, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” G. E. M. Anscombe distinguishes between the 
“moral ought” and the “ordinary ought.” The moral ought produces categorical claims, 
while the ordinary ought produces conditional claims. In her own example of the ordinary 
ought, Anscombe says that a machine ought to be oiled in order to run well.10 Borrowing 
this distinction, the remainder of this chapter intends to take the non-ethical claim that in 
order to be more effective, soldiers ought (ordinary ought) to cultivate the martial virtues, 
and combine it with the ethical claim that soldiers ought (moral ought) to try to be more 
effective. These two claims, when taken together, can be seen as a kind of role morality 
for soldiers. Far from a decisive conclusion about how we must interpret the martial 
virtues, my humble aim in what follows is only to provide one possible way in which we 
might interpret the martial virtues—to determine the plausibility of Sparrow’s assertion 
that the martial virtues are a role morality for soldiers. If the argument that follows is 
effective, it will yield some interesting results. Not the least of these is that it may be able 
to transform strategic claims about what makes soldiers good at soldiering into ethical 
claims about what makes soldiers good. 
Two Approaches 
There are two different, but closely related, ways of approaching the martial 
virtues (there are probably more, but there are two that concern us here). The first is to 
say that the martial virtues are those virtues that enable soldiers to be effective as 
soldiers. This approach, while not often directly asserted, is often implied. Military 
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ethicist Paul Robinson writes, “we live in the era of the ‘strategic corporal.’ Immoral 
behavior by even the lowest ranking soldier can have a strategic effect.”11 While he 
mentions immoral behavior, his concern with it is teleological. Rather than saying that 
soldiers ought (moral ought) to behave morally, Robinson claims that in order to remain 
strategically effective, soldiers ought (ordinary ought) to avoid immoral behavior.  
As one would expect, General David Petraeus, retired U.S. Army General, and 
former Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, discussed the morality of U.S. soldiers 
fighting in Iraq with a similar end in mind: “Our values and the laws governing warfare 
teach us to respect human dignity, maintain our integrity, and do what is right. Adherence 
to our values distinguishes us from our enemy.” Thus far a commentary on ethical 
behavior, Petraeus immediately adds, “this fight depends on securing the population, 
which must understand that we – not our enemies – occupy the moral high ground. This 
strategy has shown results in recent months.”12 While Petraeus values the morality of 
soldiers he does so instrumentally. For Petraeus, the morality of soldiers is valuable 
insofar as it positively influences strategic effects.  
Peter Olsthoorn, in his commentary on Petraeus’s remarks, is right to point out 
that the instrumental value of moral behavior for its strategic benefits and the non-
instrumental value of ethical behavior for its own sake are not mutually exclusive.13 That 
is, it may be possible to value the morality of soldiers both instrumentally (for its effects), 
and non-instrumentally (for its own sake). This understanding of virtue valued in two 
different ways is not unique to Olsthoorn. Thomas Hurka’s monograph, Virtue, Vice, and 
Value, is built upon what he calls the recursive characterization of virtue, which aims to 
explain how virtues can be both instrumentally and non-instrumentally valued.14 Sparrow 
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recognizes this duality, and makes it explicit, admitting both instrumental and non-
instrumental value of the martial virtues. “Shaping the character of service personnel is 
therefore the best way to promote the values encoded in military rules and regulations, 
including both military efficiency and ethical ideals.”15 
While it is the case that a few of the references above did allow for non-
instrumental value of virtue, this fact does little to help us progress in our understanding 
of the martial virtues. Sparrow, for example, sees the martial virtues as serving two 
functions. They (1) produce military efficiency, and (2) promote ethical ideals. Divorcing 
these two claims, we are left with (1) as the method of approaching the martial virtues 
introduced above: They are of merely strategic value. And (2) is a reference to a prior 
normative ethical system, but not an explanation of it. If, as Sparrow suggests, the martial 
virtues help soldiers to adhere to a prior moral good, we are left right back at the doorstep 
of our first question: What does it mean for soldiers to be morally good? The same 
understanding of the relationship between claims (1) and (2) can be equally applied to 
Robinson, Petraeus, and Olsthoorn above. The first—that the martial virtues enable 
effective soldiers—is a non-ethical claim. The second—that the martial virtues enable 
ethical soldiers—is an ethical claim, but an incomplete one. It presupposes moral 
obligations of soldiers, without identifying any. 
There is another possible approach to the martial virtues. In each case above (in 
Robinson, Petraeus, Olsthoorn, and Sparrow), the martial virtues are seen as those traits 
of character that enable soldiers to be effective. That is, soldiers ought (ordinary ought) to 
cultivate martial virtues in order to be proficient. Let us admit (for now) this claim as 
true, and non-ethical. Now consider a second premise. Soldiers ought (moral ought) to 
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strive for proficiency. If these two premises are admitted, we can conclude from them 
that soldiers ought (moral ought) to cultivate the martial virtues. This understanding of 
the relationships between the martial virtues, effectiveness, and ethics represents at least 
the skeletal structure of a role morality for soldiers, and lends credibility to Sparrow’s 
claim that such a role morality consists in the martial virtues. 
As some role morality theorists would have it, this view suggests that morality for 
soldiers qua soldiers consists in their being devoted to proficiency. This view eliminates 
the thesis held by Aronovitch that there is a distinction between good (proficient) 
soldiers, and good (ethical) soldiers, by collapsing the two senses of “good” (proficient 
and ethical).16 Admittedly, there is no military ethicist to whom I can point that makes 
this claim directly. That is, I know of no ethical theorist who openly admits that his or her 
interpretation of the martial virtues combines the proficiency claim with the ethical 
mandate that soldiers strive for proficiency. Nevertheless, this combination of the two 
claims supports Sparrow’s view that the martial virtues function as a role morality for 
soldiers.17 Further, it seems plausible that his view is more common than it initially 
appears. For example, Aronovitch, though he maintains his distinction between the two 
senses of “good,” ascribes importance to the virtues “for the sake of and as part of 
assuring that persons are able to carry out obligations to others and dictates of justice, 
especially in connection with their having specific roles and responsibilities.”18 René 
Moelker and Peter Olsthoorn question the sufficiency of traditional martial virtues for 
modern applications in their contention that “much depends on whether the actual virtues 
military personnel subscribe to are the right ones for a particular job.”19 Perhaps these 
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references to roles and jobs betray an intuition that what it is to be ethical qua soldier is 
inextricably woven together with what the role of soldier is. 
Our task, then, is to determine whether the martial virtues can be interpreted as a 
role morality for soldiers. This project requires a number of sequential steps. First, one 
would have to show that the role of “soldier” is a strong candidate for a morally 
determinative role.20 When this is done, one would have to show that the special 
responsibilities that befall soldiers (as people who fill that morally determinative role) 
consist in their striving for proficiency. Finally, even if these steps can be successfully 
taken, one would have to show that the martial virtues (whatever those might be) are an 
adequate measure of, or guideline for, proficient soldiering. The remainder of this paper 
will attempt, if not to take these steps, then at least to sketch a plan for how they might be 
taken. Before we can proceed in that direction, though, it may be helpful to offer a brief 
outline of role morality as conceived by some theorists. 
Role Morality 
Role morality admits two grounds for moral obligations.21 The first ground might 
be called common humanity, and this ground generates general moral obligations. These 
are obligations that each owes to everyone else, though they will certainly be contextually 
identified and developed.22 On the existence of such general obligations, many normative 
ethical theorists can agree, regardless of Kantian, utilitarian, or virtue ethical leanings. 
The views that see all moral obligations as having the same ground (e.g., common 
humanity) are collectively called “reductionist.” Role morality, however, posits a second 
kind of obligation. Here, “special relationships give rise to special responsibilities.”23 
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Views (like the role morality view) that see different grounds for different sets of moral 
obligations are called “nonreductionist.” 
To consider a few examples, suppose we can agree that Anne has a moral 
obligation to rescue a stranger, Bret, from drowning. Both adherents to role morality, and 
non-adherents, can agree that Anne’s moral obligation under these circumstances is a 
general one, grounded in her being a person able to help, and Bret’s being a person in 
need of help. Now consider a different role relationship. A father, Charlie, has a moral 
obligation to provide vital necessities (food, for example) to his daughter, Diana. Here, 
adherents to role morality will see Charlie’s moral obligation as a special one, grounded 
in his morally determinative role as her father. Non-adherents (insofar as they agree he 
faces a moral obligation in such a case) will have to find a way to explain Charlie’s moral 
obligation to Diana as a general one; that is, grounded in their shared humanity, and 
informed by circumstance, but certainly not grounded in special roles or relationships.  
There is a stronger role morality view (sometimes called “role-centered morality”) 
that views all moral obligations as grounded in morally determinative roles. Just as the 
reductionist view that all moral obligations are grounded in shared humanity has 
difficulty justifying Charlie’s moral obligation to Diana, so too do role-centered moralists 
have difficulty justifying Anne’s seemingly general moral obligation to Bret as grounded 
in a morally determinative relationship.24 
Now that we have a shared (if still fairly shallow) understanding of role morality 
in view, let us turn to our first task—determining whether “soldier” is a role that warrants 
a role morality. 
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Step 1: Is “Soldier” a Morally Determinative Role? 
The analysis of role morality in this paper will lean heavily on two theorists; 
namely, Samuel Scheffler and J. L. A. Garcia.25 According to role morality (broadly), 
there are special responsibilities that are grounded in some (and not all) relational roles. 
Though the mail carrier who delivers my mail, for example, does play a social role in my 
life, it would be difficult to articulate any special moral obligations that I owe to her 
based on this role or relationship. Certainly I may face moral obligations to her (if she 
were drowning, and I were in a position to help, for example), but under traditional role 
morality, this obligation would likely be seen as a general one that befalls me because she 
and I are both people and not because she is my mail carrier. So the role morality theorist 
first recognizes that only certain relational roles will generate special moral 
responsibilities, and then attempts to give an account of how we might classify, or 
identify such roles. 
Garcia’s position, that he admits relying on without thoroughly defending, is that 
morally determinative roles, that is, roles that generate special moral responsibilities, are 
those roles “that it is human nature to want others to play in our lives: friend, fellow 
human, parent, offspring, etc., . . . [and they] must also be ones which it is no part of 
human nature to be averse to playing.”26 
It is unclear, on the face of it, whether the role of “soldier” would meet this 
standard for a morally determinative role. While it certainly may be human nature to 
desire a defender, or champion, or someone to stand up for one’s rights and interests, any 
attempt to paint the role of “military member” with this brush will probably stretch the 
role too thin, admitting to the title of “soldier” a great many who are not, in fact, soldiers 
in the relevant sense.  
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Further, competing conceptions of what human nature consists in may have 
contradictory views on the moral validity of armies at all. C. A. J. Coady says “it is only 
those roles that can be morally supported by quite general moral considerations that will 
have a role morality,” citing the “code of the Mafia thug” as generating from a non-moral 
role.27 On this view, one can imagine a pacifist view, or even more broadly religious, 
view of human nature that allows states’ militaries as necessary evils, rather than as 
essential (or even accidental) elements of human nature. In Coady’s terms, such 
commentators might find the role of “soldier” as morally unsupportable as the role of 
“Mafia thug.” I think a contextualized view, though, can dispel these concerns. To 
borrow a clause from MacIntyre, “the world being what it contingently is,”28 it may be 
human nature to want to be defended. That is, it might be the case that when humans 
share an important relationship (like citizenship in a common state), and when that 
relational group is threatened (say, by another state), it may very well be human nature to 
want someone to defend the relational group. This is, though, mere speculation, and more 
work would have to be done in this area to develop stronger conclusions. 
Garcia does mention the role of soldier specifically in his account, but he never 
directly identifies it as either morally determinative or not. He says that “soldiers ought to 
be brave and disciplined,” but he immediately follows that claim with this one: 
“Watchmen [ought to be] alert and watchful, schoolteachers patient and 
understanding;”29 thus indicating that this particular list, though comprised of roles, is not 
necessarily comprised of morally determinative ones.30 The question, then, of whether 
“soldier” is a morally determinative role in Garcia’s scheme is left open, largely because 
it points to a prior question about human nature and the state that, not only falls to 
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political philosophy and outside the scope of this thesis, but also falls outside the insights 
of its author. Suffice it to say here that, according to Garcia’s account, while “soldier” 
may be a morally determinative role, it is certainly not so obvious a one as “sister” or 
“friend” or “parent.” 
Samuel Scheffler takes a nonreductionist role morality approach.31 That is, he 
admits that, in addition to general moral obligations, special moral responsibilities will be 
generated from special relationships. Terminologically, in contrast with Garcia’s 
“morally determinative roles,” Scheffler opts for “socially salient relationships.”32 The 
following is a brief summary of Scheffler’s seven requirements for special, relational, 
moral obligations. (1) One must have reason to value the relationship—where “value” 
refers to non-instrumental value, and “reason” to net-reason.33 (2) Only those 
relationships that are socially salient will count. Scheffler offers that there is a sense in 
which every human stands in some relation to every other. Nevertheless, the content of 
this use of “relationship” is too thin to be socially salient. (3) Value in the relevant sense 
“means valuing the relation each of us to the other.”34 It is possible for the hero to value 
himself as hero standing in opposition to the villain, and yet not value the villain standing 
in opposition to himself. Such a relationship would fail to meet this third requirement. (4) 
The relationship, though it generates special moral responsibilities, may not yield the 
only, nor even the strongest, moral responsibilities in a given circumstance. (5) There 
may be non-relational (general) moral duties in addition to relational (special) ones. (6) 
Like Garcia, Scheffler admits that people may misunderstand their relationships, and 
their special responsibilities. In this way, the responsibilities are objective. Just because 
one agent fails to recognize a relationship as socially salient, for example, that does not 
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absolve the agent of the special responsibilities generated by the relationship. Finally, (7) 
whether a relationship generates special obligations is not dependent upon whether that 
relationship is actually valued, but whether there is sufficient reason that it should be 
valued. In Scheffler’s own words, “our ability to sustain claims of this kind is clearly 
dependent . . . on a conception of the conditions under which people may be said to have 
reasons to value their relations to others.”35 He does not offer any such reasons in his 
account of nonreductionism generally, but leaves that to particular role morality 
theories.36 
Like Garcia, Scheffler does not give “soldier” any specific attention as generating, 
or not generating, special obligations. Perhaps to do justice to Scheffler’s account, we 
must recognize that he has cast his view in terms of relationships, rather than simply in 
terms of roles. Instead of considering the role of “soldier,” as with Garcia’s view, 
Scheffler’s view requires that we consider the relationships that issue from the role. 
Though there may be any number of relationships we might consider (that of one soldier 
to another, of subordinate to superior, etc.), time permits us to consider only the soldier-
to-citizen relationship here. 
Though this relationship may stand up to Scheffler’s first requirement (that it be 
valued non-instrumentally), it will do so at some difficulty. As mentioned above, in the 
kind of world in which we live, there may be reasons to think it is human nature to want a 
defender of the rights and privileges of citizenship. But if this is the relevant sense in 
which there is reason to value soldiers, then they might be valued only instrumentally. 
This is a complicated issue, and a thorough investigation (for which we do not have the 
time) would require a fairly detailed study of the reasons that soldiers may be valued. For 
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example, when a U.S. citizen thanks a service member “for her service,” what does the 
citizen mean? Does the citizen mean to say, “I value the results of the work you have 
actually done in defending me and my interests?” If so, the soldier seems to be valued 
instrumentally—the citizen is thankful for the ends the soldier has helped to secure. But 
if, instead, the citizen means to say “I value you for your admirable attitude and qualities, 
and for your willingness to defend me and my interests,” then perhaps the soldier is 
valued non-instrumentally. Even this notional exercise is complicated in that it may 
falsely equate gratitude with value. It may be possible for a citizen to value her freedom, 
but to be grateful to the soldier who she believes help to secure that freedom without 
valuing the soldier. More work would have to be done on this line of thinking. Here I can 
only say that it does not seem immediately evident that gratitude and value necessarily 
share the same object. Further we must recall that, for Scheffler, what the citizen actually 
values is irrelevant compared with what the citizen has reason to value. Again, more 
work will need to be done, but I think there is a strong prima facie case that citizens have 
reasons to value soldiers instrumentally. I do not think the case for non-instrumental 
value has the same intuitive appeal. 
Finally, on Scheffler’s view, the third requirement may, at first glance, be a cause 
for concern. Scheffler claims that the relationship must be valued “each of us to the other. 
So if, for example, I value my status as the brutal Tyrant’s leading opponent but not his 
status as my despised adversary, then I do not value our relationship in the sense that the 
nonreductionist principle treats as relevant.”37 One will notice that the requirement that 
the relationship be valued “each of us to the other” does not demand perfect reciprocity. 
Indeed, the father-son relationship can be valued in the appropriate sense, and be seen as 
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socially salient, despite the fact that each occupies quite a different role with respect to 
the other.  
I think there is something to be said for the soldier-to-citizen relationship meeting 
the “each of us to the other” requirement. It seems that, at least theoretically, citizens 
have reasons to value (even if it is an instrumental value) the soldier for her role in 
defending the rights and interests of the citizens. And, all the more in an all-volunteer 
force like that of the United States, the soldier must have reasons to value the citizens 
whom she has chosen to defend—often at personal risk, and sometimes with great 
personal sacrifice. 
As with Garcia, Scheffler leaves us grappling with important questions. The 
relationship between soldiers and citizens is an important one. Hard and fast answers to 
questions about “soldier” as a morally determinative role, or about the soldier-to-citizen 
relationship as socially salient, are goals too lofty for this chapter. Nevertheless, I think 
we are left with at least the possibility that on both Garcia’s and Scheffler’s accounts, the 
role of “soldier” (or the relationship between citizen and soldier) is at least a candidate 
for generating special moral responsibilities.  
Next, we will look at what special moral responsibilities might be generated, if 
the role of “soldier” is indeed morally determinative. 
Step 2: What Ought Soldiers To Do? 
In a sense, we are back where we began. The question posed at the opening of this 
chapter was whether the martial virtues can act as a plausible role morality for soldiers, 
but this is only an important question insofar as it helps to answer the prior question of 
what soldiers ought to do (or how soldiers ought to live). Here we ask more specifically, 
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according to the role morality described above, what are the special responsibilities that 
befall soldiers, if we admit “soldier” as a morally determinative role. 
 Scheffler, defending nonreductionism more generally, does not put forward a 
particular theory of role morality, and is thus of little help here. Garcia does present a 
singular theory, and it represents quite a strong role morality in two senses.  In the first 
sense, he holds a role-centered morality such that all moral obligations, even those that 
appear to us at first to be general, are in fact derived from our roles and relationships.38 In 
a second sense, Garcia’s position is a strong role morality in that it sees those special 
moral responsibilities as consisting in one’s devoting oneself to fulfilling such roles well. 
In Garcia’s own words, “I am not saying that we morally ought to fill these roles in the 
way people want. Rather, I am saying that there is nothing to the notion of what one 
morally ought to do or be except that being this or doing that is appropriate to, is part of, 
filling some relevant role.”39 
 It is important to note here a distinction between one’s devotion to fulfilling a role 
well and one’s actually fulfilling it well. The first is a question of one’s character, 
inclinations, and decisions, while the second is a question of consequences or results of 
that character and those inclinations and decisions. One can image two mothers who, all 
else being equal, have very different physical capabilities. Suppose one is able to sleep 
much less to maintain a certain level of productivity, while the other has to sleep more. 
They may share an equivalent devotion to their respective children, or love, or care, or 
whatever else may be inherent in what it is to be a good mother. And yet, one may 
produce different results—one may be able to do more than the other. Garcia’s role 
morality is interested in the devotion to being a good mother, in this case, and not with 
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the effects of the mother’s devotion. This point will affect our treatment of soldiers 
below. 
Perhaps Garcia’s strong role morality view will come into better focus if we 
continue to consider the role of “mother” as something of a central case in role morality 
theory. Recall, according to Garcia’s position, that a morally determinative role is one 
that it is human nature for us to want someone to play in our lives. Reasonable people 
may agree that “mother” is one such role. On Garcia’s view, then, what it is to be morally 
good qua mother, is to be devoted to carrying out the role of mother well. This view 
collapses any claims about a mother’s proficiency and her morality.40 Her morality 
generated by this role consists in her internal states and efforts toward executing the role 
well. 
For Garcia, then, if a person P fills morally determinative role R, then P has a 
moral duty to strive to fulfill well whatever special responsibilities befall P qua R.41 By 
contrast, a Kantian conception might suggest that a mother has a duty to tell her daughter 
the truth, because truth-telling is required by the first formulation of the categorical 
imperative, and that she has a duty to provide sustenance for her daughter because she 
must treat her daughter as an end unto herself. Garcia’s position may admit both moral 
duties, but sees them as generating from a single ground. Mothers ought (moral ought) to 
tell the truth to their daughters and mothers ought (moral ought) to feed their daughters 
because “mother” is a morally determinative role, and because that is what mothers do—
because that is “what it would be natural and normal for someone in [the daughter’s] 
position to want from her [mother].”42 
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 On Garcia’s view, then, if “soldier” can be found to be a morally determinative 
role, then what is required of soldiers qua soldiers is that they do what it would be natural 
and normal for someone in the relevant relation to the soldiers to expect—that they do 
what soldiers do. There are two possible steps we can take from the point. The first is 
unhelpful: We could say that being a moral soldier consists in doing what soldiers do 
well, and one of the things reasonable people expect soldiers to do is behave ethically. To 
take this step in Garcia’s system is to critically misunderstand his ethics. Garcia defines 
ethical behavior in terms of one’s morally determinative roles. It is circular, then, to try to 
define one’s morally determinative roles in terms of ethical behavior. To take this false 
step is effectively to say that what it is to be an ethical soldier is to be a proficient one, 
but one requirement of proficient soldiers is that they be ethical. 
The other alternative, and I think the only one available to us in Garcia’s system, 
is to say that ethical behavior for soldiers qua soldiers consists in their executing their 
role of soldier well, that is, in being devoted to proficiency as soldiers. Recall the two 
premises from the introduction of this paper:43 Soldiers (morally) ought to devote 
themselves to proficiency, and soldiers ought (ordinary ought) to cultivate martial virtues 
in order to be proficient. Garcia’s role morality (provided “soldier” is admitted as morally 
determinative) yields the first premise: That soldiers (morally) ought to devote 
themselves to proficiency, or ought to be for soldiering well. 
Step 3: What Makes Soldiers Proficient? 
 The previous section yielded the first of two premises. This section addresses the 
other: That the martial virtues are those traits of character that enable soldiers to fulfill 
the role of “soldier” proficiently. This point has been presented at length elsewhere, and 
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we need not reproduce the arguments here.44 What is important to note is that, while the 
martial virtues (whatever listing we choose) may be necessary conditions for proficient 
soldiers, they are probably not sufficient.  
Consider a traditional military virtue like courage. Probably the first among the 
martial virtues,45 courage may even be conceived as first among human virtues,46 and 
indeed, in antiquity, to be courageous was to be virtuous.47 Alasdair MacIntyre, apart 
from the military context, ties courage to “the care and concern for individuals, 
communities, and causes. … Courage, the capacity to risk harm or danger to oneself, has 
its role in human life because of this connection with care and concern.”48 C. A. Castro 
describes the primacy of courage this way: “Phrases such as ‘duty, honor, and country’ 
mean nothing without the courage to act.”49 Though the essence of the virtue courage 
may be as elusive now as it was in Plato’s Laches, 50 the military’s need for it is obvious. 
“The military depends on the willingness to make sacrifices, and to accept casualties for 
morally just causes such as the defense of one’s own country, or to restore peace in 
others, as can still be witnessed today.”51 Much has been written on courage. 
The application of role morality to the martial virtues contributes to this 
millennia-old discussion of courage (and of the other martial virtues) in an important 
way: It transforms the ordinary ought into the moral ought. Without role morality, there 
are two options available to martial virtue theorists. Either (a) the martial virtues are 
valuable as virtues. That is, they are of ethical significance to the same degree and in the 
same way as all of the other virtues (temperance, generosity, truth-telling, etc.).52 In this 
case, there is nothing particularly important about their being martial. Or (b) the martial 
virtues are special in that they help soldiers to be proficient, but for this reason, are of 
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only strategic, and not ethical significance. A role morality for soldiers that makes use of 
the martial virtues is able to take the best from each of these two options. It is able to 
incorporate centuries of study on the martial virtues, and introduce those resources into 
the ethical sphere. It is able to see both strategic and ethical application in what Plato, 
Aristotle, Aquinas, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and many others have had to say. 
There is a downside, though. While the martial virtues (as traditionally construed) 
may offer some appeal as part of a role morality for soldiers, they do not make the whole. 
After all, if Garcia is right, then the martial virtues are only ethically valuable insofar as 
they are able to improve soldiers’ proficiency.53 Thus any character trait (or physical 
skill) that improves proficiency is of the same ethical value in the soldier’s role morality. 
The traditional martial virtues of honor, courage, and loyalty, then, necessarily lose their 
pride of place, or the prestige they once held, as governors of lethal warriors. Or perhaps 
better understood, the more mundane and tedious skills of soldiers are elevated to the 
grandiose position the martial virtues once held exclusively.  
Garcia may be right that “intuitively we think that to lack the loyalty that would 
make one a good friend, to lack the compassion that would make one a good fellow 
human being … are moral failings, just as intuitively we think that being a bad shortstop 
or a bad liar is not a moral failing.”54 Nevertheless, if “soldier” is a morally determinative 
role, and if the special requirements that fall to those soldiers consist in their being 
devoted to proficiency as soldiers, then some failings that would otherwise seem non-
ethical will, in fact, be moral failings. If steady hands and sharp eyes help to make 
soldiers more effective, then cultivating a steady hand, and a sharp eye are moral 
obligations no less than the moral obligation to cultivate honor and courage. There is 
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something profoundly counterintuitive in the claim that, for soldiers, a failure to learn to 
shoot strait is a moral failure of the same kind as the failure to cultivate honor, or loyalty, 
or justice;55 but this is the conclusion to which Garcia’s role morality brings us when it is 
applied to soldiers. Next to the difficulty in establishing “soldier” as a morally 
determinative role, I find this point to be the most troubling element of the role morality 
for soldiers we have investigated here. 
Insofar as this thesis is a response to Sparrow’s conclusions about drone pilots, 
my reader may very easily argue that I have committed a kind of straw man assault here. 
I have ascribed to Sparrow a particular view of role morality that he has not claimed for 
himself, and then identified some weaknesses in that view. I respond by acknowledging 
that there are a precious few role morality theories about, and though Sparrow is 
committed to the martial virtues as a role morality, he has not identified any such role 
morality view in particular. The most prudent response and the most benevolent to 
Sparrow, then, is to assume on his behalf the strongest role morality view available, and 
carry it through in its application to soldiers to see how it fares. This section has been 
such an attempt. Further, our discussion has not shown that the role of “soldier” cannot 
generate special moral obligations, but only that more work must be done to answer the 
question. 
The Next Step 
 There are reasons that the role morality for soldiers approach is appealing. Paul 
Robinson has noted that the great majority of state militaries (with the exceptions of 
Israel and Canada) have failed to include virtues such as “respect for human dignity” and 
“respect for human life” in their lists of martial virtues or values.56 Robinson suggests 
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that, for reasons of efficacy and efficiency, “in a time of supposed humanitarian 
operations, for which public opinion demands the highest standards in the treatment of 
civilians (and of captives), more emphasis on virtues such as respect for human dignity 
would seem to be required.”57 Robinson’s argument from efficacy and efficiency has its 
place, but is limited to the strategic sphere. On his line of thinking, it seems that under 
different circumstances, or in different times, efficacy may not demand that soldiers act 
with respect for human dignity, and thus, such respect is not a moral responsibility for 
soldiers. 
 Role morality, though, leaves open the possibility of multiple grounds for 
multiple sets of responsibilities. It may very well be the case that soldiers acting in their 
morally determinative role as soldiers have a special moral obligation to be strive for 
proficiency and do their best to achieve tactical and strategic effects, and that at the same 
time, they have a general moral obligation to respect human dignity.58 Structuring and 
prioritizing duties generated from different grounds is notoriously difficult.59 When these 
two moral obligations generating from different grounds—to achieve military effects and 
respect human dignity—conflict with one another, any theory will have a difficult time 
justifying a scheme to prioritize them. But at the very least, we are left with a system that 
adequately justifies an intuition—and I think it is a common one—that soldiers have a 
moral duty to try to win the war and a moral duty to treat enemy combatants, detainees, 
and civilians with respect as human beings. Indeed, a role morality view leaves open the 
possibility (and perhaps necessity) that each of these relationships be treated separately, 
and meaningfully.  
	   30	  
Though a particular woman, for example, may have special responsibilities as 
someone’s mother, she may have an additional set of special responsibilities as someone 
else’s sister. Her moral life consists in a weaving together of her general moral 
obligations and the moral obligations generated by her numerous morally determinative 
roles. It is likely the case that soldiers too have different sets of special moral obligations 
to each other, to their own state’s citizens, to enemy soldiers, to civilians, to their own 
superiors, and to their own subordinates. While the result would be a dizzying 
intersection of moral duties—perhaps impossible to correctly prioritize—I think such a 
dizzying set of duties conforms to our intuitions. This matrix of intersecting relationships 
and duties might explain why some Americans have been willing to accept torture as an 
acceptable (albeit morally objectionable) practice, because they saw their moral 
obligations to those prisoners as outweighed by their moral obligations to their own 
fellow citizens. It might explain why the United States chose not to engage militarily in 
Syria on behalf of threatened civilians prior to the rise of the so-called Islamic State terror 
group in 2014. While there may have been a genuine duty to defend those citizens, that 
duty may have been overcome by the United States’ duty to protect its own soldiers. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to determine whether the martial virtues can be seen as a role 
morality for soldiers. The answer, as it turns out, is not simple. What this chapter has 
shown is that if “soldier” can be admitted as a morally determinative role, then a role 
morality can indeed be ascribed to soldiers—soldiers (morally) ought to strive for 
proficiency. The martial virtues, as traditionally construed however, probably represent 
an insufficient guide for military proficiency. They may be a necessary inclusion and 
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therefore of both strategic and ethical value, but they must make room for other equally 
important means of military efficacy. Finally, this chapter has shown that a role morality 
for soldiers, if admitted, would produce a complex and layered set of moral obligations 
for soldiers; but I think when we observe soldiers in the world, a complex and layered set 
of moral obligations is precisely what we see. The next chapter will determine the 
propriety of applying this relationship between the martial virtues and role morality to 
military drone pilots in particular.	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Chapter Two – Martial Virtues for Drone Pilots 
Two Problems 
 In the previous chapter, we saw that the role of “soldier” may, under role 
morality, generate special moral obligations, and that these moral obligations may 
include the cultivation of martial virtues. This chapter discusses the application of such a 
role morality to drone operators. Specifically, this chapter engages Rob Sparrow’s claim 
that drone pilots, based upon their physical distance from the battlefield and the absence 
of any personal risk, are unable to meet the demands of such a role morality. 
Let me say first that I do not intend to actually apply a role morality for soldiers to 
drone operators. Put another way, I have no intention of evaluating the role morality of 
drone operators qua soldiers. There are two reasons for this: First, there is something 
inherently problematic about assessing the morality of those who fill one role (“drone 
pilot”) against the role morality generated by a different role (“soldier”). Second, in this 
particular case, the moral obligations generated by a role morality for soldiers include 
virtues, and to evaluate a person’s virtue is to judge her character. Character judgments 
based solely on vocation (e.g., drone pilot) will yield spurious results. Rather than trying 
to answer these questions, this chapter attempts only to investigate and explain these two 
concerns: The problems with assessing the role morality of drone operators qua soldiers, 
and the problem of assessing the character of individual drone pilots in light of their 
vocation alone. Much like the previous chapter, my goals here are modest. I do not 
intend, on the one hand, to say with any certainty how we should apply a role morality to 
drone pilots qua soldiers, nor, on the other, that it is an impossible task. I mean only to 
identify and explain two major areas of concern inherent in such a project. 
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Drone Pilots qua Soldiers 
This discussion can proceed smoothly only if we clearly identify and define some 
critical terms at the start. First, by “soldier,” I mean a uniformed member of a sovereign 
state’s military. By “drone pilot,” I am referring to uniformed military personnel who 
operate lethal military air vehicles from great distances.1 Neither this argument nor the 
one in Sparrow’s chapter is concerned with CIA or other non-military drone applications. 
By these definitions, all drone pilots are soldiers. Additionally, we should recognize that 
just as “soldier” is a role, “drone pilot” is also a role. It may not be (and probably is not) 
morally determinative as according to the standards established in the previous chapter, 
but it need not be for our purposes here. All we need to agree upon here is that “military 
drone pilot” is a role, and all who fill the role of “military drone pilot” also fill the role of 
“soldier.” 
Sparrow argues that drone pilots cannot meet the demands of a role morality for 
soldiers. He presents separate arguments for each of four martial virtues, but to 
summarize very briefly, the structure of his argument can be characterized in these four 
steps: (1) The martial virtues function as a role morality for soldiers.2 (2) The requisite 
martial virtues can only be cultivated if one is physically present in the battlespace and 
faces personal risk to oneself.3 (3) Drone pilots are not physically present and face no 
risk.4 (4) Therefore, drone pilots will either be unable to meet (in the case of loyalty, 
courage, and mercy) or will face significant difficulty in meeting (in the case of honor) 
the demands of the role morality for soldiers.5 
Generally, Sparrow does not claim that drone pilots are faced with the opportunity 
to cultivate these virtues and fail to do so, but rather—by the nature of the role of “drone 
pilot”—they are afforded no such opportunity. Sparrow’s argument faces significant 
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problems when it comes into contact with our definitions above (which are, I think, 
reasonable definitions for “soldier” and “drone pilot”). 
A Role Within a Role 
Put in formulaic terms, suppose there is a role “R” that generates moral 
responsibilities. The set of people, S, is defined by the role “R” (such that every S is R), 
and D is a subset of S (every D is S). Thus far, all the moral responsibilities generated by 
the role “R” fall to every S, and therefore, to every D. And yet, suppose we found that 
every D is unable (not unwilling) to meet the moral demands that befall them as people 
who fill the role “R.” This set of relationships produces the dual conclusion that (1) moral 
duties fall to every D and (2) that every D is unable to fulfill those duties.  If we rest on 
the long-held principle that “ought” implies “can,” then there is a structural problem 
somewhere in the argument. Put in another way, R generates duties for every S, and S 
includes every D, but every D is unable to meet the duties in question. This is a logical 
problem. 
There are two obvious places we might amend the argument to solve the problem. 
First, we might be mistaken to believe that every D is S. Or second, we might be 
mistaken about the special responsibilities generated by R. 
To return to the language of drones and soldiers, the role of “soldier” generates 
special responsibilities to all soldiers. Drone pilots are soldiers, and yet according to 
Sparrow, drone pilots are unable to meet the moral demands of the role “soldier.” As 
above, there are two places we might amend the argument in order to solve the logical 
problem. We might be mistaken in our claim that drone pilots are, in fact, soldiers; or we 
might be mistaken about the special moral responsibilities generated by the role of 
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“soldier.” That is, the martial virtues required of soldiers may not be, as Sparrow claims, 
dependent upon personal risk and physical presence. 
There is, of course, another possibility. We can admit that drone pilots, in fact, 
face some risk; but we will save this question for Part II of this thesis. 
To admit that drone pilots are not actually soldiers would solve the logical puzzle, 
but would miss the bigger point. The reason that this issue of drones and ethics is so 
widely and energetically debated among scholars (and others) is precisely because it has 
changed, or is changing, what it is to be a fighting military force—what it means to be a 
soldier. To say, then, that in order to deal with this change, we choose to maintain our 
traditional conception of soldier, such that it requires personal risk, to the exclusion of 
drone operators, is to sidestep the most interesting and important questions that drones 
raise. In a sense, this line of argument is insufficient because it ignores the obvious 
empirical data. Drone pilots, whether we like it or not, are soldiers. To say that they do 
not face the risks that traditional soldiers have faced is only to acknowledge that they are 
different; and recognizing their difference poses important questions about their ethics; it 
does not answer them.  
Further, if one chooses to solve the logic puzzle by claiming that drone operators 
are not actually soldiers, then one cannot say that they fail to measure up to a soldier’s 
role morality. One can only say that they are not subject to that role morality. If one 
dismisses drone operators from the role of “soldier,” then the claim that “drone pilots fail 
to meet the moral demands of the role of ‘soldier’” is of exactly the same value as the 
claim that “concert pianists (and cattle ranchers, and philosophy professors) fail to meet 
the moral demands of the role of ‘soldier.’” If we dismiss drone pilots from the genus of 
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“soldier,” we likewise jettison any moral ground on which to demand that they behave 
like good soldiers, that they submit to jus in bello requirements, and that they try to 
cultivate any martial virtues at all. It seems, then, that removing drone pilots from the role 
of “soldier” will likely create more problems than it solves. 
There is a second option. We could admit that the role morality prescribed for 
soldiers is insufficient because it does not apply to all who fill that role. This option is 
more plausible. On this view, we must acknowledge that while, at first, it may have 
seemed that the role of “soldier” generated special moral responsibilities with physical 
risk as a necessary condition, further analysis revealed that such a role morality 
mischaracterized the role of “soldier” as necessarily involving physical risk. Thus, we 
might amend Sparrow’s third claim in the list above, that the martial virtues required by a 
role morality for soldiers can only be cultivated if one is present in the battlespace and 
faces personal risk to oneself. 
In defining martial virtues in terms of personal risk and physical presence in the 
battlespace,6 Sparrow has distinguished between a virtue that is for traditional military 
people, and a virtue that is for other people. He has created a new virtue that is strictly 
martial. In his discussion of loyalty and drone pilots, he writes that “even if a Predator 
drone comes to the rescue of others by destroying an enemy who was threatening troops 
on the battlefield just in the nick of time, the operators will have shown no bravery and 
undergone little hardship.”7 Whether this statement is true or not is, for the moment, 
irrelevant. What is more important is that Sparrow has implicitly required that any act of 
loyalty include an act of physical bravery. He denies drone pilot loyalty by saying they 
“have shown no bravery.”  Ordinarily, we would see these two virtues as distinct from 
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one another. In conflating them, Sparrow has defined a special kind of loyalty—a risk-
requisite loyalty—that is available only to those in traditional martial contexts. Under this 
narrow definition, it should come as no surprise that many modern soldiers (and not only 
drone pilots) would be unable to cultivate it. 
Sparrow takes a similar turn in his discussion of honor. He defines honor as 
social. “To be a good Marine, [for example] is to live up to the tradition of the Marines.”8 
Thus, “the virtue of (a sense of) honor consists in larger part, then, in being able to pick 
out the appropriate group of people whose opinions should matter to us.”9 Drone pilots 
are at a severe disadvantage in this regard because they are “alienated from two groups of 
people who should properly be an important resource for the development and 
maintenance of a sense of honor: … their immediate comrades, [and] the enemy 
warriors.”10 Here, the virtue of honor is not defined explicitly in terms of personal risk, 
but in terms of proximity to the battlefield. Drone pilots are alienated based upon their 
physical distance from friendly and enemy combatants, and this physical distance makes 
the kind of honor Sparrow has defined inaccessible to them. 
Sparrow appears to recognize some of the implications of these risk- and 
presence-requisite virtues in his discussion of moral courage. Even as he argues that 
drone pilots face little opportunity to cultivate moral courage, he admits that “pilots of 
these systems must be willing to make life-or-death decisions, including the decision to 
kill another person, in circumstances where making the wrong decision may lead to the 
death of other warfighters. Thus, piloting drones is not for the fainthearted.” 11 One 
wonders what positive trait drone pilots must possess if they lack “faint-heartedness.” 
Whatever word we choose it will probably sound something like “morally courageous.” 
	   40	  
It seems from this quotation that Sparrow is willing to admit that drone operators are able 
to cultivate something like “stout-heartedness,” but because he has defined the martial 
virtues as risk- and presence-requisite, he refuses to admit a correlation between strong-
heartedness and moral courage. 
This step—narrowly defining martial virtues in terms of traditionally martial 
contexts—may be worth some additional consideration. Perhaps rather than define a 
particular kind of martial honor, and a particular kind of martial loyalty, etc., we need 
only to demand the same kinds of virtue that may be demanded of other citizens in other 
roles. In this way, just as a schoolteacher, or a postal worker, or a bank teller can cultivate 
the character traits of honor, courage, loyalty, and mercy, so can a soldier, and so can a 
drone operator. This is, though, only an initial thought and more work would be required 
to develop such a theory. 
Virtue and Vocation 
The second problem with Sparrow’s account is that it intends to assess the virtue 
of a set of human agents defined only by their vocation. The claim that drone operators 
are unable to cultivate (or face great difficulty in cultivating) various virtues presumes 
too much (or perhaps too little) about each individual agent. The limitations of this 
approach will become clear when we recognize that the role morality for soldiers (as 
proposed in the previous chapter) includes the obligation to cultivate virtues. Virtue 
cultivation is about character, and at least to some degree, influenced by habituation. 
One’s ability to cultivate certain virtues depends upon a number of variables and while 
vocation may influence one’s virtue cultivation, it is by no means the sole influence. 
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A thorough study of virtue theory (for which we do not have time here) would 
reveal that ideas about how one goes about developing a given virtue are numerous. 
Many theorists do agree, however, that virtue is about character.12 Daniel Statman 
introduces virtue ethics by identifying shortcomings in other normative ethical 
approaches, and specifically, the inadequacy of principles to govern moral action. “If 
principles are insufficient to guide our behavior and cannot simply be ‘applied’ to 
concrete situations, some other factor must be at work in real-life decision-making. This 
factor, according to [virtue ethics], is character.” And again, “[virtue ethics] now refers to 
a rather new (or renewed) approach to ethics, according to which the basic judgments in 
ethics are judgments about character.”13 Similarly, J. L. A. Garcia writes that “in moral 
assessment we are concerned not with personality but with character which, roughly, 
means having (and identifying with) certain projects and desires.”14 Additionally, 
Rosalind Hursthouse agrees with Aristotle that virtue is a character trait.15 And even 
Alasdair MacIntyre, though he avoids the word “character,” calls virtue an “acquired 
human quality.”16 
We should note here that there is no consensus on the centrality of character 
among ethical philosophers, but for our purposes, there need not be. The aim of this 
section is to show that according to Sparrow’s own presuppositions about virtue 
cultivation by habituation, we must be willing to look at the agent’s character on the 
whole, and not merely at her present vocation. In adopting Aristotelian (or neo-
Aristotelian) habituation as the method by which virtues are cultivated, Sparrow seems to 
at least tacitly concede that to some significant degree virtue is about character.17 Indeed, 
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he openly admits that “shaping the character of service personnel is … the best way to 
promote … both military efficiency and ethical ideals.”18 
If it is the case, then, that a role morality for soldiers requires virtue cultivation, 
and if it is also the case that virtue cultivation involves habituation and the development 
of one’s character over time, then a soldier’s ability to meet, or success in meeting, the 
requirements of that role morality must be based upon character; and surely vocation 
alone is insufficient to assess a person’s character. 
Virtue Cultivation Among Drone Pilots 
Below is one notional example, followed by a very few real-world examples 
(indeed, there are only a few real-world examples available) that suggest the 
insufficiency of making character judgments of drone pilots based solely on their role (or 
vocation) as drone pilots. 
Consider, as a notional example, a drone pilot named Alice, and for comparison, 
consider an army infantry soldier named Bob. Suppose the only information with which 
we are furnished is that Alice is a drone pilot who operates an aircraft “[removed] from 
the theater of operations entirely, allowing [her] to ‘fight’ wars in complete safety from 
the air-conditioned comfort of [her] command module;”19 and Bob is a combat veteran 
infantry soldier with multiple tours of duty in Afghanistan. It is the case that, if this is the 
only information available, we may expect that Bob has probably had greater opportunity 
to cultivate (or fail to cultivate) the martial virtue of courage, for example, than Alice. 
But this assessment of virtue is a character assessment made with very little observation 
of either Alice’s or Bob’s circumstances. We certainly cannot say with any confidence 
that Bob is actually more courageous than Alice, and for two reasons. 
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First, though Bob may have had more opportunities to cultivate the virtue of 
courage, he may have failed to do so. That is, through those many exposures to risk, he 
may have cultivated, not the virtue of courage, but the vice of cowardice. The fact that he 
was faced with the opportunity to cultivate virtue is not alone enough to conclude that he 
did in fact cultivate it. Even if Sparrow’s argument is accepted, then, whether or not a 
certain soldier or group of soldiers possesses, or is even more likely to possess, the 
martial virtues, is inconclusive. The only difference we can expect between Alice and 
Bob is in the varying opportunity each has had to cultivate virtue. 
Second, we know very little of the other circumstances that have contributed to 
and affected the character of each agent. Perhaps it is the case that, although Alice is 
currently a drone pilot, she has previous combat experience in the F-16 (a U.S. Air Force 
fighter aircraft). Even if we are convinced by Sparrow’s arguments about drone 
operators, he admits that fighter and bomber pilots do not face all of the same obstacles to 
martial virtue cultivation that drone pilots do.20 So if Alice cultivated the martial virtue of 
courage through her F-16 experience, and then transitioned to the MQ-1 Predator, she 
may still have a courageous disposition as a trait of her character. 
Far from a strictly hypothetical circumstance, this is precisely the experience of 
many U.S. drone operators. The U.S. Air Force’s Transformational Aircrew Management 
Initiatives for the twenty-first century (TAMI 21) program recognized the over-staffed 
fighter and bomber career fields as a potential solution to meet the personnel 
requirements of the rapidly growing MQ-1 and MQ-9 drone programs. The result was the 
transfer of a large number of pilots from fighter and bomber assignments to drone 
assignments.21 It seems, then, that if Sparrow’s assessment is to be taken seriously, he 
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would have to distinguish between those drone pilots that have previous flight experience 
(and thus, have had opportunities to cultivate martial virtues), and those that do not. 
The problem becomes even more pronounced once we recognize that the prior 
experience of the U.S. Air Force’s drone pilot cadre is not limited to other cockpits. One 
U.S. Air Force drone pilot, identified only as “Captain Rob” for security reasons, was an 
Air Force Security Forces Officer before he transitioned to the drone program.22 This is 
of significance in that the duties of Air Force security forces personnel are as like the 
duties of Bob the Army infantry troop as any in the Air Force. “Directing air base defense 
functions,” officers like Captain Rob “control and secure the terrain inside and adjacent 
to military installations as well as the personnel, equipment and resources within. 
Responsibilities include directing team patrols, tactical drills, battle procedures and 
antiterrorism duties.”23 These are military men and women that carry automatic weapons, 
move out in squads and fire teams like the army and, when required, engage the enemy at 
close range. Whatever conclusions Sparrow has drawn about the potential for drone pilots 
to have cultivated the martial virtues, they do not apply to Captain Rob and others like 
him. 
All this is to say that Sparrow’s claims about the ability for drone pilots to 
develop certain character dispositions are made without any knowledge of each 
individual’s life experiences and circumstances—and it is those experiences and 
circumstances that will provide an agent with opportunities to cultivate virtue.  
Having recognized the importance of each drone pilot’s experiences prior to 
accepting their role as drone pilot, it takes only a small step to also recognize the 
contribution of the agent’s varied duties as a drone pilot. Sparrow is quick to point out 
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that some of the drone pilot’s responsibilities include controlling an aircraft 
“[successfully removed] from the theater of operations entirely.”24 But this description is 
not exhaustive of the drone pilot’s professional duties.  
The technological architecture that allows drone operators to control their aircraft 
half a world away is the satellite communication link between the ground control station 
(GCS) and the aircraft. One unintended consequence of this system, however, is a latency 
between the pilot’s control inputs and the aircraft’s response. The result is that, while an 
aircraft can be successfully operated from the other side of the world, it cannot be 
successfully landed from the other side of the world.25 The Air Force calls this 
architecture Remote Split Operations (RSO). A critical element of the U.S. drone 
program’s tactical success in areas of responsibility such as Iraq and Afghanistan has 
been the forward deployment of Air Force drone crews to launch and land aircraft. For 
example, the 62nd Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron operates MQ-1 and MQ-9 
aircraft from Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan. “The crews use satellite uplinks that allow 
the transfer of control between the deployed local pilots who taxi, launch, land and 
recover the aircraft from trailers near the flight line and the crews based in the U.S. or 
UK.”26 What this means is that, even though drone crews will spend a significant portion 
of their time in the safety of an air-conditioned trailer in the continental United States, 
from time to time, they will don their Kevlar and M-4 rifles to travel to, and live in, the 
war zone.  
This acknowledgment is critical to recognizing the limitation of assessing the 
virtue of a person based only on their vocation at a given moment. Virtue ethics is not 
concerned (primarily) with particular actions, but with particular agents. A Kantian or 
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consequentialist approach to drones might concern itself with the singular action of 
pulling a trigger and killing an enemy from the other side of the world. Virtue ethics, 
though, is concerned with the character of the agent. And that character is cultivated and 
refined over long periods of time based on repeated exposures to circumstances, and the 
agent’s willful response to those varied circumstances. It matters a great deal, therefore, 
that drone crews experience the traditional military life, exposed to the traditional 
military threats, and bearing traditional military burdens—even if less frequently than 
some of their peers. To say that drone pilots have not experienced the demands (to 
include the risks) of military life is to fail to understand the U.S. Air Force personnel 
system, expeditionary force model, and operations tempo throughout the thirteen years 
the U.S. has been at war. 
This chapter has held the humble aim of identifying two major problems with 
applying a role morality for soldiers in general to drone pilots in particular. With these 
arguments in view, it becomes clear that rather than eliminating drone pilots from the role 
of “soldier” in the relevant sense, it may be far more fruitful to re-engage the role 
morality generated by the role of “soldier” (if in fact “soldier” generates a role morality). 
Rather than developing an entirely new taxonomy of virtues that are applicable and 
accessible only to warfighters, the better alternative is to demand that soldiers be 
honorable, loyal, courageous, and merciful in the traditional senses of these terms—that 
is, in the same sense in which they would apply to civilians. Rather than alienating 2,500 
years of philosophic contemplation on the martial virtues from the modern conception of 
soldier, in these globally troubled, and militarily charged times, our conception of the 
soldier ought to accept wisdom from any century that can offer it. 
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Thus far, then, in chapter one, we saw that the role of “soldier” may indeed be 
morally determinative, that is, it may generate special moral obligations, and that those 
obligations may include the cultivation of martial virtues. This chapter has shown that, 
while it may be unhelpful to evaluate the whole class of drone pilots according to these 
special obligations, it may indeed be possible to ask whether a particular drone pilot is 
honorable, courageous, loyal, or merciful. This discussion has taken place while 
temporarily admitting Sparrow’s premise that drone pilots face no risk. The next two 
chapters will engage the issue of risk directly.	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PART II: RISK 	  
The previous two chapters sought to answer questions about whether there can be 
a role morality for soldiers, and if there can be, how drone pilots might measure up 
against such a moral standard. That discussion took for granted the claim that drone pilots 
face no risk to themselves in the conduct of their military duties. The two chapters that 
follow challenge this claim. Chapter three presents the case that drone pilots do, in fact, 
face psychological risk. And further, that because their actions are—of necessity—in 
defense of someone else, their lethal activity in the face of this risk can be seen as an act 
of sacrifice. Chapter four presents a brief argument, or the outline of an argument, that 
drone pilots may also face some physical risk, however limited in probability. 
Specifically, chapter four intends to show that any absence of physical risk to drone pilots 
is contingent on political and strategic circumstances, and does not categorically follow 
from the nature of remote weapons systems. 	  
Chapter Three – Psychological Risk 	  
A 2013 Defense Department study found that drone operators are diagnosed with 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at the same rate as pilots of traditionally manned 
combat aircraft.1 The lost life of a wartime combatant is often called the ultimate sacrifice, 
and rightfully so—what more can one give? But without diminishing that sacrifice, we 
can, at the same time, recognize a different kind of sacrifice. Asking men and women to 
die in service to their country is a serious business. But insofar as it produces negative 
psychological effects, asking them to kill for it is serious too. This chapter aims to show 
that remote killing can be an act of sacrifice, and that this conception of killing as 
sacrifice will affect the discussion of drone ethics more broadly. 
	   50	  
 The argument that follows rests upon the premise that not all killing is the same. 
Though language may be insufficient to capture the gamut of possible acts of killing, one 
recognizes that “murder,” “genocide,” “suicide,” and “execution” are all terms that 
denote an act of killing but each act is different from the others. The discussion below 
recognizes a further distinction among different kinds of killing in war. Namely, that the 
killing that takes place in self-defense (by a proximate killer) is a different kind of act 
than the killing in defense of another (by a remote killer).2 
 The chapter will begin with a few thought experiments to establish the possibility 
that, first, one who is being attacked, in addition to his right to defend himself, may have 
a right to be defended by someone else. Second, a third party who is neither attacking nor 
being attacked, may face a moral obligation to defend the one being attacked. Then, some 
attention will be given to the psychological implications of killing in general and some 
conclusions drawn about potential psychological costs associated with remote killing. 
 The subsequent section will develop the claim that 2001 witnessed a turning point 
in the development of military technology. Physical distance between the shooter and the 
target has reached a kind of boundary. As such, future technological developments will 
produce a dynamic shift in the relationship between physical distance and emotional, 
psychological, or empathetic distance. 
 The final section will tie the preceding arguments together and conclude that 
remote killers, when killing in defense of another, may accept some psychological risk, 
and that they may do so for the sake of another. Thus, the act of killing remotely may be 
seen in such situations as an act of sacrifice. I will then, very briefly, situate these 
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conclusions in the context of Rob Sparrow’s claims about the virtue of drone pilots in his 
chapter, “War Without Virtue?”3 
Remote Killing and Proximate Killing: Two Acts 
The following does not intend to argue that self-defense can justify killing under 
certain circumstances. Instead, the whole discussion admits the justificatory work of self-
defense as an assumption.  Jeff McMahan calls the claim that “there are occasions on 
which it is permissible intentionally to kill another person in self-defense” axiomatic to 
contemporary ethical theory.4 The argument in this section builds on this assumption to 
argue that however plausible self-defense justifications for killing may be, justifications 
by defense-of-another are even more so. 
 Consider a notional conflict between a just and unjust combatant.5 The unjust 
aggressor (called “Attacker”) forces a choice on the just combatant (called “Defender”) 
such that one of the two will die: Attacker will kill Defender unless Defender kills 
Attacker first. Suppose that Defender kills Attacker. In this case, Defender’s action is in 
self-defense and is morally justified. 
 Suppose in the second case that Defender is unable to ward off the attack, but 
there is a third party, fighting on Defender's side, who is able to intervene (called “Third 
Party”). Third Party intercedes, killing Attacker and saving Defender’s life. 
In both cases Attacker, who imposed the forced choice situation, is killed. In the 
first case, however, the one doing the killing (Defender) does so self-interestedly. 
Defender might say something like, “Attacker must be killed because he threatens me and 
I don’t want to die.” In the second case, Third Party’s action is anything but self-
interested. Third Party might say something like, “Attacker must be killed because he 
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threatens someone else.” There is a prima facie sense in which Third Party's action in this 
case is more admirable than Defender’s own.  
The justificatory work of self-defense is based upon the choice Defender faced: 
Either kill, or do nothing and die. Third party faced a different choice: Kill, or do nothing 
and live (allowing her fellow to be killed). This is a substantive difference. Third Party 
chooses to kill, not for her own sake, but for the sake of another. Certainly, Defender may 
have been partially motivated by a sense of justice in seeing Attacker punished, or seeing 
an unjust action thwarted for justice's sake. Likewise, Third Party may have been 
partially motivated by selfishness, knowing that she would be a happier if her comrade 
lived. I will call this “the self-interested gain” and we will return to it later. For now, it 
seems clear that, in either case, the self-interested gain is a peripheral concern. In a more 
fundamental sense, Defender is motivated by self-interest and Third Party is not. 
To make the case further consider another notional example. In this case, there is 
violent though non-lethal crime, like a mugging, involving three similar people. Attacker 
attacks Victim (formerly called Defender) on a busy city sidewalk, while Third Party 
steps over the scuffle and continues on her way. Suppose, in this case, Victim refuses to 
fight back, surrendering his right to self-defense. Victim and Third Party may, then, offer 
almost identical accounts of their respective actions. Victim might say, “I was being 
attacked, and I did nothing.” Third Party may say, “he was being attacked, and I did 
nothing.” In Victim’s case, the response seems intuitively admirable. He seems somehow 
virtuous and honorable, laying down his own right to self-defense. Third Party, though, 
who responded in almost exactly the same language, seems, at the very least, morally 
questionable. She did nothing, though she could have done something. She might have 
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taken action to defend Victim, but she chose not to. Intuitively, one can conclude that 
Victim’s moral position improves with inaction, while Third Party’s moral position 
suffers with inaction.  
If our intuitive sense is right, it demonstrates the possibility of two significant 
elements in the relationship between Defender and Third Party. (1) While Victim has a 
right to defend himself, he may also have a right to be defended by someone else; and (2) 
Third Party may face a duty to intervene on Victim’s behalf. These reciprocal 
conclusions are evident in that, by refusing to aid, Third Party appears to have done some 
disservice to, or failed to act justly toward, Victim. 
These two questions, namely, whether Defender, in fact, has a right to be 
defended, and whether Third Party, in fact, has a duty to intervene, are admittedly left 
open.  This brief section is insufficient to draw compelling conclusions as to the 
normative ethical questions at stake. The preceding discussion serves only to show that 
these claims might be the case; and the mere possibility may impact a proper ethical 
assessment of the remote killer. 
Costs and Benefits 
 One possible objection to the argument thus far was briefly mentioned above. 
Someone might say that when Third Party acts (killing in defense of another), she may, 
even if only in part, be acting self-interestedly. As a result, her action is no more, and 
possibly less, morally defensible than that of Defender who kills in self-defense. 
A thorough response to this objection will be filled out in the remainder of this 
section, but here we can begin to sketch the response by clarifying the cost-benefit 
relationships involved: There is a self-interested gain for Third Party—perhaps she will 
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be happier if her fellow soldier lives. There is a cost to Third Party, and there is the other-
interested gain for Defender (he keeps his life). The broad argument of this chapter 
suggests that the above ordering is from smallest to largest (or least significant to most 
significant). That is, Third Party's potential self-interested gain is smallest. It is less 
significant than the associated cost to Third Party, and minuscule compared to the gain in 
saving Defender's life for Defender's sake. In order to argue for this sequence, the 
remainder of this section must demonstrate that there is a cost to Third Party that can be 
reasonably believed to be of greater significance than the self-interested gain to Third 
Party. 
Put another way, in order to assess Third Party's motives, we might ask why she 
acts in the way she does. If she acts self-interestedly, it can only be because the self-
interested gain outweighs the cost to Third Party.  If she acts other-interestedly, it is 
because the other-interested gain outweighs the personal cost. Neither of these 
conclusions can be accepted until we properly understand the cost that falls to Third Party. 
The Cost of Remote Killing 
 Just because the remote killer is not exposed to physical suffering, does not mean 
that she is not exposed to any suffering at all. There is, after all, non-physical suffering. 
Much has been said on this topic, and I will not develop a complete argument for it here. 
But as introductory examples, we can consider the non-physical suffering produced by 
hate speech, torture and bullying. 
Rae Langton argues that hate speech is a kind of assault on the hearer, 6 and others 
argue further that such speech should be taken out from under First Amendment 
protections.7 This argument suggests a genuine presence of suffering unrelated to 
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physical pain. On the suffering caused by torture, Jessica Wolfendale argues that “our 
judgment of whether an act constitutes torture should … focus on … whether the 
torturer’s aim is to cause extreme suffering—to ‘turn its victim into someone who is 
isolated, overwhelmed, terrorized and humiliated.’”8 These terms focus on mental, 
emotional, and spiritual (not physical) pain, again demonstrating the reality of non-
physical suffering. Finally, from an otherwise unrelated field, we learn that those who 
have been bullied are between 1.4 and 10 times (depending on the study) more likely to 
attempt or consider suicide than their non-bullied peers.9 In each case, the bullying victim 
either has sufficient psychological trauma from past bullying experiences to drive her to a 
suicidal decision, or she is willing to take her own life out of fear of future bullying. In 
either case, the decision to attempt suicide demonstrates the severity of this kind of non-
physical suffering. This very brief survey serves only to show that the reality of non-
physical suffering is widely accepted across numerous fields of study. Building on this 
premise, then, let us count the cost of remote killing. 
 It is unnatural for one human being to kill another. U.S. Army Psychiatrist, Dave 
Grossman, has written extensively on this topic. In his account, On Killing, he concludes, 
“there is within most men an intense resistance to killing their fellow man. A resistance 
so strong that, in many circumstances, soldiers on the battlefield will die before they can 
overcome it.”10 S. L. A. Marshall’s interviews with more than 400 infantry companies 
after World War II revealed that only between 15% and 25% of the soldiers fired their 
weapons against the enemy, even when they were in a position to do so.11 Seth Lazar 
explains that “most soldiers have an understandable aversion to killing, which can be 
overcome only through intensive psychological training.”12 
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 If killing one’s fellow human being is unnatural, then one can expect 
psychological consequences for doing so. Grossman explains those consequences in 
detail. Quoting Richard Gabriel, Grossman warns that “nations customarily measure the 
‘costs of war’ in dollars, lost production, or the number of soldiers killed or wounded,” 
even though “psychiatric breakdown remains one of the most costly items of war.”13 
Grossman suggests that human beings cannot “easily throw off the moral inhibitions of a 
lifetime … and kill casually and guiltlessly in combat.”14 One of Grossman’s many 
interviews with combat veterans revealed an important quotation to our discussion of 
drone pilots. “Often you can keep these things out of your mind when you are young and 
active, but they come back to haunt your nights in your old age.”15 
 The above references regard, not remote killings, but proximate ones. The remote 
killer may be subjected to similar psychological costs, and in some ways those costs may 
be seen as more acute. Recall the forced choice scenario above. In it, Defender could 
either kill, or do nothing and die. Third party though, could kill, or do nothing and live. 
The latent psychological result of this distinction may be significant. No matter what 
deadly acts the proximate killer may have committed, in his old age, he may be able to 
rest on the assurance that he had no choice, or rather, that his only other choice was death. 
The remote killer, in a ground control station half a world away has no such emotional 
comfort. It remains to be seen how old age will treat the remote killer who choses, not 
between her own life and her own death, but between the life and death of another.  
Boundary and The Kantian Sphere 
If it is in fact the case that killing one’s fellow human is unnatural, then there are 
two methods by which drone operators (or remote killers, more broadly) may overcome 
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this instinct. Lazar has given us the first: Intensive psychological training. Grossman 
offers the second: Killing at a distance. Grossman argues that the greater the distance, the 
easier it is to kill. 
Someone will object here that if distance makes killing easier, then any argument 
for a psychological cost to remote killers is invalidated. That is, if Grossman is right, and 
killing at a distance is easier, then perhaps drone operators, because of their very great 
distance from their enemies, face no psychological risk or cost at all. This objection fails 
in the face of two interrelated observations. The first is a distinction between physical 
distance and emotional distance. The second is an understanding of the technological 
architecture of U.S. drone systems. 
Some have re-told the history of combat weapons development as a continuous 
race toward remote killing: Each technological advancement allows an incremental step 
beyond the enemy’s weapons range.16 Technological developments have allowed the 
transition from swords to slings to pikes to longbows to tanks;17 and now to drones. 
With this progression in view, one recognizes the significance of the U.S. drone 
control mechanism. The satellite-based communications architecture used for armed U.S. 
Air Force drones allows the aircrew to employ their weapons from the other side of the 
world.18 Barring significant improvements in space travel, how much farther can they go? 
Immanuel Kant recognized that the spherical nature of the earth imposes a geometric 
boundary that has necessary implications on international relations.19 In the same way, 
the earth’s geometry also creates a boundary to the physical distance from which one 
person can kill another person. If pilots are in the United States and targets are in 
Afghanistan then the boundary has already been reached. 
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One should not suppose, now that physical distance has reached a maximum, that 
technology will cease to develop. Technology will continue to develop, and with that 
development, based upon the geometric boundary, physical distance cannot increase; but 
information transmission rates can. The U.S. Air Force is already pursuing high 
definition cameras,20 wide area motion imagery sensors, 21 and increased bandwidth to 
transmit all this new data.22 
Grossman suggests a negative one-to-one correspondence between physical 
distance and resistance to killing.23 That is, killing up close is psychologically more 
difficult, while killing at a distance is psychologically less difficult. On Grossman's 
account, as distance approaches infinity, psychological effects become increasingly 
benign. Thus, drone operators, being so far from their lethal effects, would face almost no 
psychological impact at all; but technological developments have shattered the one-to-
one model. 
If technology has driven the shooter (the drone pilot, in this case) as far from the 
weapons’ effects as Earth’s geometry allows, then future technological developments will 
not increase physical distance, but they will increase video quality, time on station, and 
sensor capability. Now that physical distance has reached a boundary, future 
technological developments will exceed previously established limits. That is, killers will 
not increase their physical distance from the killing. Instead they will decrease their 
psychological distance from the target. They will decrease empathetic distance,24 and the 
psychological resistance to killing will increase.  
It may have been the case up to this point, that technological developments 
produced physical distance, and that physical distance resulted in empathetic distance. 
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When the U.S. government mounted an AGM-114 Hellfire missile onto an MQ-1B 
Predator in November 2001, it changed that relationship.25 For centuries, technological 
developments decreased psychological resistance to killing, but no longer. 
The boundary imposed by the sphere of the earth has driven a wedge between the 
long-standing correlation between physical and empathetic distance. Now that physical 
distance has reached a boundary, future technological developments will bring the 
shooter (in this case, the drone pilot) psychologically closer to the weapons effects. What 
was only a dark collection of pixels on a black and white infrared display yesterday will 
be the look of a man’s eyes tomorrow. The future of drone operations will see a 
resurgence of some of the elements from the old wars. Operators will look “in a man’s 
face, seeing his eyes and his fear . . . the killer must shoot at a person and kill a specific 
individual.”26 The command, “don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes” may soon 
become as meaningful in drone operations as it was at Breeds Hill in 1775.27 
This is not a science fiction claim about the future. The technological 
developments that have brought us to this point have already begun to render their 
psychological effects: Drone operators are already being diagnosed with post-traumatic 
stress disorder.28 These men and women have paid a psychological cost based on their 
emotional proximity to the killing—and they paid that price in service to their country. 
It is not merely the case that the drone pilot defies Grossman's one-to-one model. 
It is not merely the case that the drone pilot is an outlier, or an anomaly, in an otherwise 
comprehensive system. Drones are deconstructing traditional distance relationships. As 
these weapons push their operators to the greatest physical distances possible, 
empathetically, they pull the operators in, closer than ever before; and that empathetic 
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gravitation toward the front lines of battle will undoubtedly produce second order 
psychological effects. 
Drone Pilots and Risk 
There are two elements that differentiate the remote killer and the proximate killer, 
or in our original terms, Third Party and Defender. The first is the other-interested 
motivation of Third Party's actions. This element alone may be sufficient to make her 
actions more justifiable than those of Defender. Second, there is the cost to each. 
Defender, as a proximate killer, is subjected to personal physical risk, and the 
psychological effects of killing. In the remote case, Third Party is not subjected to 
physical risk, but does face psychological risk. Based on the absence of the kill-or-be-
killed forced choice, and the decreased empathetic distance resulting from technological 
developments, Third Party's psychological risk may be greater than that faced by 
Defender. Time will tell. Though the psychological claims here are theoretical, and much 
work is left to be done, this much is certain: If there is a cost that falls to Third Party, 
while the benefits fall to Defender, then Third Party's action is one of sacrifice. 
Remote killing understood as sacrifice necessarily affects the discussion of risk 
and justified killing. If self-defense is to justify killing in war, as many of the 
commentators agree that it does, then defense-of-another is likewise capable of justifying 
killing in war. The application of this argument to Sparrow’s claims about role morality 
is clear. Even if one accepts Sparrow’s claim that there are risk-requisite martial virtues 
(as addressed in the previous chapter), drone pilots do face some risk. It is not the same 
kind, or of the same magnitude, as the risk faced by infantry soldiers, but it need not be. 
Sparrow’s conclusions about the virtue of drone pilots is built upon the claim that, 
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although a great number of weapons systems reduce risk to their operators, drones are the 
first such weapons to eliminate it. This is not so. Not only do drone pilots face 
psychological risk, their role as other-interested defenders in the face of psychological 
risk make them co-equal with their traditional military peers as candidates for the virtues 
of honor, courage, loyalty, and mercy. Drone pilots can be—despite their physical 
distance—good soldiers in the moral sense. 
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Chapter Four – A Note About Physical Risk1 
 
While in the previous chapter, we saw that drone pilots may face psychological 
risk, here I address the question of physical risk. Many of the ethical concerns over 
drones are grounded in the recurring claim—one with significant prima facie appeal—
that drone pilots are not present on the battlefield. Bradley Strawser, even in defending 
the ethical use of drones, concedes that their operators are “not even present in the 
primary theater of combat.”2 Jai C. Galliott, in his response to Strawser, distinguishes a 
fighter pilot from a drone pilot by saying that, whatever the altitude, at least the fighter 
pilot “remains in the air; therefore the [enemy soldier] still has a human to target, 
regardless of how futile his efforts may be.”3 And, as quoted in a previous chapter, 
Sparrow describes drone pilots as “[successfully removed] from the theater of operations 
entirely.”4 
This chapter argues for a new conception of the battlespace such that it includes 
drone operators, wherever they may be. The term “battlespace” is chosen here to avoid 
the etymological limits of the classical term “battlefield.” The introduction of airpower in 
the twentieth century had profound implications on warfare.  Until that time, the term 
“battlefield” was sufficient because the battle took place on the surface of the earth. On 
this conception, aircraft—despite their significant tactical and strategic implications in 
the twentieth century—were not present on the battlefield. Thus, airpower forced military 
minds to re-conceive of a battlespace such that it includes the air domain.  Since then, not 
only has airpower progressed, but so have other military technologies.  That region 
containing the elements used in battle is no longer simply represented by lateral 
boundaries drawn on a two-dimensional map.  This development has been of such 
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significance that in the 1990s, the U.S. military replaced the term “battlefield” with 
“battlespace” universally.5 This note is of value, not only in defining our terms, but also 
in that it illustrates that drones are not the first technological development to cause us to 
redraw the battlespace. 
Two Scenarios 
The following are two scenarios to which I will refer throughout the course of this 
short chapter. In Scenario 1, a technologically dominant State X employs an F-22 (an 
advanced, traditionally manned fighter aircraft) carrying an assortment of precision-
guided munitions against a tribal warrior of technologically limited State Y who is 
wielding only a rocket propelled grenade (RPG).6  In Scenario 2 the State Y tribal 
warrior’s weapon remains the same, but this time State X employs a drone whose pilot is 
in a ground control station (GCS) some 7,500 miles away.  
This comparison between F-22 and drone is critical. If any ethical argument 
against the drone proves equally applicable to the F-22, then the argument is not an 
argument against drones as such, but against drones as instantiations of airpower more 
broadly. To make a claim about the ethics of drones is to claim something about the 
nature, or implications, of the remoteness of the pilot. Arguments that fail to isolate the 
remoteness of remotely piloted aircraft are misleading and disingenuous. While such 
arguments may have their place in a broad discussion about the ethics of war, or the 
ethics of technology, they are misleading and inappropriate in the narrow discussion of 
the ethics of drones. 
In Scenario 1, State X has redrawn the boundaries of the battlespace such that it 
includes the F-22’s nominal 50,000-foot altitude.  The tribal warrior with his RPG 
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probably would have preferred to limit the battlespace to the earth thereby restricting his 
adversary to an engagement envelope commensurate with his combat capabilities 
(namely, the RPG).  But, as the case of the F-22 illustrates, a state may choose to redraw 
the battlespace while maintaining jus in bello requirements.  In this particular case it was 
the technological advantage that provided the dominant state such prerogative. 
In Strawser’s discussion of a scenario like Scenario 1, he says that the difference 
between the F-22 and the drone is one of degree and not one of ethical category. But the 
change is not simply, as he supposes, in the distance between the combatant and his foe,7 
but instead in the size and scope of the battlespace. The F-22 pilot is not 50,000 feet 
above the battlespace.  The battlespace has expanded to include him. The same is true of 
the drone pilot on the other side of the world—the battlespace has been redrawn to 
include her. 
The Twenty-First Century Battlespace 
Just as technological developments of the twentieth century demanded that both 
war planners and ethicists conceptualize the battlespace in three dimensions rather than 
two, the remote weaponry of the twenty-first century demands that war planners and 
ethicists conceptualize the battlespace as comprised of multiple parts rather than as 
unitary. That is, rather than describe a single and complete battlespace as “The Pacific 
Theater,” and another as “The European Theater,” as in the twentieth century, 
globalization, satellite communications, distributed command and control networks, and 
of course drones, require that we re-conceive of the battlespace as including all elements 
of the battle, wherever they may be. In the Second World War, a bridge in France or a 
railroad in Holland may have been targeted for its contribution to the enemy’s war-
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making capabilities. That such a bridge was physically located in the “European Theater” 
was merely accidental. The bridge and railroad of the previous century may be replaced 
by a satellite communication station and frequency band in this one—even though one 
exists physically in one place, and the other, electromagnetically on the frequency 
spectrum. 
Someone will respond by arguing that though the drone pilot represents a valid 
military target, the limited state cannot feasibly attack that target, and therefore, she is 
still outside the battlespace. In this way, State X breaches a risk asymmetry threshold, 
violating jus in bello requirements. But against this feasibility argument, the F-22 
comparison stands.  The RPG-toting tribal warrior is as likely to successfully engage the 
drone pilot thousands of miles away with his weapon, as he is to engage the F-22 pilot at 
50,000 feet. If the F-22 is in the battlespace, so is the drone pilot.  
Furthermore, just because the drone pilot is thousands of miles away does not 
mean that he is invincible.  It is here that the two scenarios above expose an unstated 
premise.  If the RPG is the only weapon available to the tribal warrior, then both targets 
are impossible to engage, and the asymmetry problem that results does not contribute to 
an argument against drones as such, but against airpower in general, and is thus outside 
the scope of this paper. 
This premise, though, probably limits the application of Scenarios 1 and 2 
artificially. In reality, any technologically limited state probably has a wider array of 
weapons available to it than just the RPG. We will return to this point below. For now, 
we need only acknowledge that any state, even a technologically limited one, that has the 
	   67	  
means of striking the technologically dominant state on its home soil will not generate jus 
in bello asymmetry problems for drones qua drones.8 
The ability to redraw the battlespace is not unique to the dominant state. Consider 
this notional scenario.  Technologically dominant State A and technologically limited 
State B are at war under presumably justified jus ad bellum conditions. The war takes 
place entirely in State B’s coastal regions.  One entrepreneurial State B soldier believes 
that his anti-aircraft weapon will see better success if he employs it from the water.  The 
soldier boards a State B military vessel by himself and pilots it more than 12 nautical 
miles from his home country and therefore into international waters.  From there, he 
attempts to engage State A’s aircraft with his weapon.  Until this time, State A has 
limited its aerial attacks to State B’s land.  Under these circumstances, State A aircraft are 
justified in engaging the State B soldier in international waters because the State B 
soldier, in this case, has chosen to redraw the battlespace such that it includes some 
portion of those waters.9  Perhaps State A would have preferred that the battlespace not 
include international waters. In this case State A’s preferences are of little concern as 
State B has executed its prerogative to redraw the battlespace.   
Collateral Damage at Home 
State X’s decision to operate drones from its homeland is no different. Actions, 
though, have consequences. The State B soldier has induced some additional collateral 
damage risk into his circumstance.  Not only the State B boat, which may have otherwise 
been left alone, but any surrounding international boats may be at risk due to the State B 
soldier’s decision. Similarly, State X has assumed some additional risk with its use of 
drones.   
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Consider three scenarios in which a State X fighter pilot can be engaged during a 
war with State Y.  (1) She might be engaged while flying her aircraft in combat. (2) She 
might be engaged while conducting official business on the ground; writing post-mission 
reports, conducting an inspection of her aircraft or planning the following day’s mission.  
(3) Or she might be engaged while doing something not directly related to her combat 
mission; something like sleeping, or eating.  State Y is justified in engaging the fighter 
pilot in any of these scenarios, and each scenario carries with it some collateral damage 
concerns.  The other military or support personnel at the dining hall or sleeping quarters, 
for example, may be at risk in situation (3).  However, if State X’s war is carried out in 
the way dominant states have recently carried them out, that is, if the fighter pilot is 
operating from a forward deployed location, based close to the enemy and within the 
range of its combat capabilities, then the military and support personnel accepted some 
level of risk just by being at the forward deployed location. 
It is here that the collateral damage concerns change drastically with drone 
operations. The drone pilot might similarly be engaged in any of the three situations 
above, but unlike the case of the deployed fighter pilot, these engagements would take 
place within State X’s borders. Just as the State B impromptu boat captain induced 
collateral damage risk when he redrew the battlespace, so too has State X induced risk to 
some of its civilian citizens and resources when it decided to conduct drone operations 
from within its homeland. When the drone operator eats and sleeps, it may not be in a 
barracks full of deployed military members, but in her home with her family. The risk of 
collateral damage has shifted from military members in the case of the fighter pilot to 
civilians in the case of the drone pilot. 
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 While this new conception of a redrawn battlespace does address some ethical 
concerns with the employment of drones, it does not follow that using drones in this way 
is strategically advantageous.  Put another way, the preceding argument only shows that 
the dominant state may be ethically justified in using drones, what it does not show is 
whether that justified use of drones is in the best interest of the dominant state.  The 
technologically dominant state ought to consider the impacts on collateral damage and 
inviting war to its homeland before employing such a weapon. 
 Regardless of the strategic concerns, this new conception of the redrawn 
battlespace makes clear the fact that drone pilots do, at least theoretically, face some 
physical risk. The legal and moral structures are in place to allow for a strike against 
domestically based drone pilots. While the enemies the United States has engaged in the 
last decade, for example, have had a limited ability to engage them, future enemies may 
not be so inhibited. This chapter has shown that any claims about an absence of physical 
risk to drone pilots are, at best, contingent upon an enemy of limited military 
sophistication. No such categorical claims can be made. 	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have some method of striking the technologically dominant state on its own soil, I see this as a limitation in 
principle only and not in application. While dominant states may be the ones developing technology, 
technological developments in general affect worldwide affairs.  Though dominant states may have 
developed jet propulsion and the modern air transportation system, for example, Al Qaeda (a 
technologically limited organization) used this air travel technology to target the U.S. on September 11th, 
2001. To suppose, then, that State X will continue to develop advanced technology without yielding any 
tactical advantages to State Y seems to be an artificial supposition. 
9. This question is concerned with the ethical and moral issues associated with the scenario rather 
than the legal ones. 	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CONCLUSION: THE VIRTUOUS DRONE PILOT 	  
The preceding chapters developed the claim that drone pilots can, indeed, be 
virtuous, and more specifically, that they can cultivate martial virtue. Chapter one 
investigated whether the role of “soldier” generates special moral obligations, and 
whether those moral obligations consist in cultivating the martial virtues. It yielded the 
soft conclusions that “soldier” may be such a role, and that if it is, those special moral 
obligations may include the cultivation of some martial virtues. 
Chapter two demonstrated the internal inconsistencies in claiming that a species 
(“drone pilot”) is unable to meet the moral demands of the genus (“soldier”) to which it 
belongs. It further demonstrated the limitations in assessing a person’s virtue, or potential 
for virtue cultivation, knowing only her vocation. As each drone pilot is a human being 
who has faced, and continues to face, varied contextually defined circumstances, the 
virtue, and potential for virtue cultivation, of each must be determined individually. 
Chapter three recognized the psychological effects that have manifested in some 
drone operators, and argued that such psychological threats represent risk in the 
traditional sense, even if not of the same kind as the risk faced by traditional soldiers. The 
chapter also argued that because drone operators are physically dislocated from their 
weapons effects, the benefits of those effects always fall to someone else (usually 
friendly forces on the ground). Therefore, drone pilots face a cost in their exposure to 
psychological risk, that someone else might reap the benefits. This act, therefore, is one 
of sacrifice on the part of the drone pilots; suggesting that perhaps drone operators may 
be in a better position to cultivate virtue than is immediately apparent. 
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Finally, chapter four presented a case for physical risk. Though drone operators 
are physically dislocated from their weapons effects, that fact alone does not render them 
invincible. By employing remote warriors as it does, in moral and legal terms, the United 
States (for example) has redrawn the battlespace such that it includes the drone operators, 
wherever they may be. Thus a peer threat (or near-peer threat) may target drone operators 
with conventional military means. Additionally, an asymmetric threat may target drone 
operators with unconventional means. Chapter four yielded the recognition that just 
because domestically based drone operators have not historically faced physically harm, 
that does not mean that they face no physical risk. 
The preceding arguments, then, have been primarily negative—they have argued 
against the claim that drone operators cannot be virtuous. What remains in this brief 
conclusion is to put forth a positive account of virtue among drone operators. 
On my view, martial virtues are virtues. Martial honor is not a peculiar kind of 
honor, available only to those who kill and die vocationally. Martial loyalty is not a 
special loyalty, shared only by those who are loyal unto death. Instead, martial virtues are 
merely moral virtues that have a particularly thick application in the military context. 
While non-military people may, and likely will, face opportunities to cultivate the virtue 
of courage, military people can be expected to face such opportunities more frequently, 
and the consequences for failing to cultivate courage will be more severe. There are a 
number of advantages to this view. Not the least of which is that the martial virtues retain 
their value under a breadth of normative ethical theories.  
Rosalind Hursthouse offers a helpful distinction between virtue ethics and virtue 
theory.1 Within the field of philosophical ethics, one can give the virtues, and a virtuous 
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character, a central role in an ethical theory. Daniel Statman summarizes this project by 
saying that “what is essential [to virtue ethics] is the idea that aretaic judgments, i.e. 
judgments about character, are prior to deontic judgments, i.e. judgments about the 
rightness or wrongness of actions.”2 Hursthouse calls this kind of project “virtue ethics.” 
By contrast, one can investigate the virtues without giving them a central role. For 
example, a consequentialist could develop virtues because their cultivation might tend to 
produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Likewise, a Kantian 
could develop virtues because they are an aid in meeting the demands of deontic 
imperatives. Hursthouse calls this kind of work “virtue theory.”3 
It seems that, regardless of whether one adopts a virtue ethics or a virtue theory 
approach, the virtues are of value, or importance, or necessity for individual ethics. In the 
case of virtue ethics, the foundational questions are about how one ought to live. In 
Hursthouse’s words, “the virtues make their possessor good qua human being.”4 If this is 
the case, one cannot admit that courage, honor, friendship, nor even a particular kind of 
each, is a virtue for soldiers, but not for others. Martial virtues as virtues more broadly 
are those traits of character that promote the flourishing of human beings. 
There is a strong prima facie case that, even in virtue theory, if a virtue is of value 
for one person it must also be of value for another. We must remember that virtues are 
cultivated over time, whether by habituation, or some combination of habituation and 
predisposition. Given, then, that one cannot know all the future circumstances one will 
face, surely reasonable people can agree that, one is more likely to bring about the 
greatest good if one is loyal, honorable, courageous, a friend, temperate, etc., than if one 
is vicious. Ignorant of future events, we might suppose that the soldier is more likely to 
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face circumstances such that his cultivation of courage will yield higher goods than the 
grocer’s cultivation of courage in his own circumstances. It in no way follows, though, 
that the grocer ought to cultivate cowardice, nor even to ignore the cultivation of courage. 
Instead, courage is a virtue for the soldier and a virtue for the grocer. Likewise, 
cowardice would be a vice in each. If there is a difference in the value of the outcomes 
for each person, the difference will be one of magnitude. If forced to choose, I suppose I 
would rather have a coward for a grocer than a coward for a soldier, but even 
consequentialism (insofar as it is concerned with virtue at all) demands that both try to 
become courageous. 
My view does not allow for a situation in which honor is a virtue for one member 
of society, but not a virtue for another.5 Thus, when we say that the grocer is honorable, 
we mean something serious about her character, or her will, or her general way of being. 
When we say that the soldier is honorable, we mean the very same things. However, we 
can expect this character, or will, or way of acting, to manifest itself in quite a different 
way. This is not because the two individuals are of a different kind of character from one 
another, but only because they face different sets of circumstances from one another. 
Further, if it is the case that the question virtue ethics seeks to answer is not “how 
one ought to act” but rather, “how one ought to live,”6 then this similarity in character but 
difference in circumstance between the grocer and the soldier should come as no surprise. 
A courageous civilian will behave differently when attacked in a dark alley than when 
coaching his child’s baseball game. This is not because his character is of a different kind 
at one time than at the other. That is, it is not the case that he is courageous in the first 
instance, but cowardly in the second. Instead it is because his circumstances are of a 
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different kind in each case; the first demands courageous action, while the second does 
not. Likewise, it is not difficult to see the broad differences in the circumstances that will 
likely be faced by the courageous soldier and those likely faced by the courageous grocer. 
There is a better reason, though, to conceive of martial virtues as moral virtues. If, 
instead of conceiving martial virtues as virtues, one siphons the martial virtues off from 
the larger reservoir, creating for it a special place, a special cultivation, and a special 
subset of humanity to whom they are available, then a discussion of military honor, 
courage, loyalty, and friendship can neither contribute to, nor benefit from the ancient 
and contemporary resources otherwise available. Military ethicists would needlessly cut 
themselves off from a vital and flourishing field within normative ethics. But when we 
admit the martial virtues as merely moral virtues that will be challenged more frequently, 
and the cultivation of which (or lack thereof) will have more severe consequences in 
military application, the whole history of ethical philosophy opens its doors to us. Not 
only the ancients, but the recent resurgence of virtue theorists also have something 
valuable to say about soldiers and the military. 
A final reason to allow the martial virtues to be seen as moral virtues is that such 
a claim allows the empirical evidence in chapter two of this thesis to speak more clearly. 
Though positions on virtue cultivation may vary in nuance, they are largely agreed upon 
as to the importance of character, and with slightly lesser consensus, the value of 
habituation. Drone pilots, at least as they exist in the United States at present, are men 
and women who are exposed to psychological risk even as they sit in their ground control 
stations. They submit to this psychological risk in the defense of the fighting men and 
women on the ground, thereby sacrificing their own well being for that of another. 
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Insofar as they support launch and recovery operations, they are subjected to the same 
deployments, hardships, and physical risks of their counterparts in the area of operations 
(AOR). Many drone pilots bring to the relative safety of the ground control stations prior 
military experience, which undoubtedly brought with it the opportunity for virtue 
cultivation. And finally, by operating from home, they expose their communities and 
their homes to enemy actions that are justified by the requirements of jus in bello. This is 
not by any means an argument that all drone pilots are virtuous, but it is certainly an 
argument against the claim that no drone pilot is virtuous, and indeed against the stronger 
claim that no drone pilot can be. The empirical claims from chapter two, combined with 
the theoretical arguments throughout this thesis, demonstrate a strong reason to trust the 
virtuous drone pilot.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (Fall 2013). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue 
2. Daniel Statman, “Introduction to Virtue Ethics” in Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader, ed. Daniel 
Statman (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 8. 
3. Ibid 7. 
4. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 20. 
5. I use the term “society” here to allow for MacIntyre’s system. MacIntyre defines a virtue as “an 
acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods 
which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such 
goods.” The practices to which he refers, however, may vary from one society to another. As such, 
“different societies have had different codes of truthfulness, justice and courage.” Thus, it may be possible, 
on MacIntyre’s view, that a virtue for a soldier in one society may not be a virtue for a soldier in another. 
However, even in MacIntyre’s system, it is not possible that a virtue for a soldier in one society would be 
anything other than a virtue for a grocer in the same society. Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Nature of the 
Virtues,” in Virtue Ethics, eds. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
128-130. 
6. In Robert B. Louden’s terms, “It is by means of this conceptual shift that ‘being’ rather than 
‘doing’ achieves prominence in virtue ethics.” Robert B. Louden, “Kant’s Virtue Ethics,” in Virtue Ethics: 
A Critical Reader, ed. Daniel Statman (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 288. 
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